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## **Modern State and New “Shackles”**

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## ABSTRACT

*The subject of this article is a critical analysis of the thirty-two-year post-socialist „transition“ in Montenegro and its immediate area in terms of revisiting the existing crisis practices and many of the dilemmas that I have been thinking about. Among them, the pernicious quasi-neoliberal experiment occupies a dominant place. The purpose of this article is, in addition to confirming real institutional changes, to demystify the interests and anti-developmental ideological and dogmatic platform, apologetics and politics of this experiment, which led to a vicious circle of crisis repetition. I have tried to explain this „ominous transitional phenomenon“ (E. Husserl's expression) in this articles, highlighting its main causes and effects, using descriptive, politico-economic, institutional and comparative analysis, with selective quotations from well-known authors. Although the text offers several hypotheses, one of them was the main one for me: the reproduction of any social evil is possible only under conditions of institutional underdevelopment and a quasi-institutional alternative. In conclusion, it is stated that the instruments of violence were distributed among the elite groups. In this sense, we suggest to liquidate alternative institutions and privileged "elites".*

**KEY WORDS:** Modern state, transition, quasi-neoliberal experiment, crisis, “new elites”, alternative institutions

## INTRODUCTION

In this article also tried to identify the government's nomenklatura as the main culprit in mentioned "*ominous transitional phenomenon*" and the creation of many „new shackles“<sup>1</sup>. Although this concept is interdisciplinary and essayistic in nature, it is dominated by an economic approach. It involves the simultaneous observation of the economy as a complex whole of three interrelated and intertwined subsystems: science (theory), economic policy (decision making) and economic practice (actions of economic entities and their results). From the point of view of general philosophy and especially economic philosophy, this is a synergy of three different and complementary worlds of abstraction: the world of competing ideas, the world of competing

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<sup>1</sup> „The so-called post-communist transition is an ideological trap into which the capitalist West, which won the Cold War, lured former socialist societies into absolute dominance and unrestricted control over them. He managed to impose on them one non-alternative goal - blind imitation of the West. Their whole future was reduced to repeating someone else's past. Moreover, post-socialist societies have been given over to a kind of Western tutelage, like some of the youths of history who have not reached maturity to control their own destiny. Such was the price of integration into global capitalism, in which many of these societies were destined to never achieve the prosperity and power of their masters and speculators ... These vassal relations have a pronounced neo-feudal character. In this sense, the transition as a process is directly opposite to enlightenment. So not a way out of one's own immaturity, in which Kant saw the meaning of enlightenment, but, on the contrary, a voluntary acceptance of this state of one's own immaturity and the need for mentoring...“ (Buden, 2021)

ways (methods) and the world of competing things. I believed that such a methodological approach would make it easier and better to distinguish between institutional and opportunistic and alternative behaviour and thus more clearly verify the proposed scientific argument related to the subject and purpose of this study. This manuscript mainly refers to the economic and social reality of Montenegro (where I live) and its neighbouring countries (region). Of course, I do not exclude other transitional "recognitions". I tried, scientifically and politically, extremely neutrally, exclusively through the prism of the systemic-phenomenological paradigm, to critically suggest the need to rethink and eliminate an interest, quasi-neoliberal concept (Draskovic M. et al., 2016, 2017, 2017a, 2019), as a new destructive and dogmatic experiment that contributed to the emergence of „new shackles“, that is, major abuses and problems hindering development not only in Montenegro, but also in many countries with economies in transition. There are certain terminological repetitions in the text. They are deliberate, inevitable and functionally aimed at enhancing the impression, at a better understanding of individual phenomena and their interconnections, emphasizing their importance and pointing a critical edge against the soullessness, immorality, lawlessness and injustice of extreme quasi-neoliberal monism (Draskovic, V. and Draskovic, M., 2013).

This article is not an attempt to provide a complete and definitive answer to these many and complex questions. It is only a descriptive and critical analysis of some negative post-socialist social manifestations and their cause-and-effect relationships, which often turn into social “shackles” and hinder progress. In all my analyses, I proceeded from the well-known fact that in most of the "transitional" countries, allegedly democratic and liberal changes ("reforms") were carried out without the social, economic, political and institutional conditions previously created for their successful implementation. All these "reforms" were carried out mainly by party cadres, often without work experience, hastily, occasionally, voluntaristically, without a consistent development strategy and consultation with the profession, and with selfish motives. Of course, my analysis concerned primarily Montenegro and neighbouring countries (the former SFRY).

Therefore, after 33 years, it seems that all these so-called neo-liberals (putative "marketers", "shockists", "reformists", "gradualists" and "monetarists") were, in fact, quasi-neoliberals, i.e. selfish conductors. I deeply believe that by overcoming the various modern shackles with which I have metaphorically and symbolically marked the main barriers to transitional socio-economic development, the mentioned acceptable world could be established, in which the rule of law and formal institutions would dominate. They would prevent the phenomenon of "*Faustian settlement*" (in terms of the strength of alternative institutions, not knowledge, work, success and results), which is based on dogmas, myths and negative selections that prevent the establishment of real democracy, leading to the spread of non-freedoms and institutional violence as defined by D. North et al. (2009). Moreover, this phenomenon absolutely and paradoxically confirms the ironic Russian proverb: "*A better democrat*

*than your humble servant has not yet been born.*" In the end, and from a philosophical point of view, trusting absolutely anyone is not freedom!

## 1. ACCEPTABLE WORLD

It is difficult to imagine an objective narration of the subjective discussions associated with neoliberalism and its many paradoxes, myths, criticisms, approvals and contradictions, which are dominated by antinomies and disagreements. This story is not only a phenomenological and ontological critique of a crisis and long process (quasi-institutional monism that does not give up) with poor results but also a sincere commitment to institutional pluralism, which I consider the imperative of development and civilization, which should become a milestone in a gruelling struggle for the realization of so many proclaimed freedoms, democracy, institutionalization and a better, more just, humane and developed society (order) and standard of living in general.

I often remember the words of H.A. Simone (quoted in Aleksic, 2007, p. 128): *"Think about what a sustainable and acceptable world should look like. Notice I didn't say the best possible world. I don't know how to define such a world."* Then I imagine how to describe such a world? Probably so that it functions better, more efficiently, more honestly and institutionally. Whatever this world is called, it must include real political democracy (the absence of personal and party despotism), developed and effective social and economic institutions (institutional pluralism), a developed civil society, the legality of all types of elections and human behaviour, freedom and morality. entrepreneurship, fair taxation, stimulation of knowledge, culture and creativity of people, an effective system of environmental protection that satisfies the level of law and freedom, the subordination of institutions to the interests of citizens and the functional complementarity of economic efficiency and social justice. In addition, it is necessary to build and improve the state and society in parallel, and not create a state and neglect society.

The nomenclature of the government and political parties should not be identified with the state, and they should not forget that they are only a service to the state and the people. It is not clear why such a system of government is not being built that will prevent the spread of injustice, lack of freedom, negative selection, inequality and privileges? Why are they constantly and unsuccessfully looking for the *"philosopher's stone"* (Shatalin, 1989, p. 19), that is, the unsolvable socio-economic "squaring of the circle" is being solved? And this is always stubbornly done with slogans, stereotypes and promises (communist, socialist, post-socialist, neoliberal, quasi-neoliberal and others). But in fact - all this is done in various forms and manifestations of dirigisme, party dominance, interest motivation and opportunistic behaviour.

## 2. MAIN REASONS FOR THE TRANSITION CRISIS

The main reasons for the ongoing crisis of transition lie in the recipes and practices of quasi-neoliberalism. It gave rise to great problems and deformations, and in essence created a new dogma, a new elite system of privileges and, consequently, “new shackles”. He identified deep contradictions between individualism and collectivism, liberalism and dirigisme, legally unacceptable and logically incomprehensible private and group interests, irresponsible “games without rules” and organized “*games with higher rules*”, in which the main goals of the so-called. The “reformers” had great interests. This is evidenced by their huge wealth and polarized poverty and stratification in society. It is symptomatic and regrettable that with all this, at the height of the information age, the authorities are programming and using all possible (fraudulent) methods of ignoring knowledge and mass moronisation of society (making fake diplomas, allowing plagiarism, negative selection of personnel, destroying values criteria, etc.). At the same time, they abuse institutions and existing culture (Bozovic, 2021).

It is too naive to expect that consciousness, conscience, morality, mentality, culture, motives and habits of people can change quickly, through some rhetorical and palliative changes (the so-called “reforms”). As a result, “reforms” failed in most transition countries. There have been many failures in the levels of alignment of public and private interests (which can be divided into massive and rare, i.e. privileged), real institutional changes and the rule of law. Practice has shown that even institutions that should regulate all social elements and subsystems are rapidly changing and adapting to the needs of interests! It has been scientifically proven that they change in the long-term historical perspective. This means not only their imperative development, strengthening and improvement but also the formal transformation of some (old) institutions into others (or their recombination). They sometimes abuse power nomenclatures in order to strengthen of the so-called alternative institutions. The creators of alternative institutions correspond to quasi-market regulation (hybrid, uncontrolled, unregulated, disorganized, monopolized, cartelized, narrow interest), which is not found anywhere in developed countries. Alternative institutions are non-civilizational in nature! In this regard, many questions can be asked, of which, perhaps, the most important one is the connection of monopoly, neo-totalitarianism and violence with the formation, existence and strengthening of alternative institutions. Therefore, that's why we gave it a try to explain the modern post-socialist paradox and the phenomenon of post-totalitarianism (neo-totalitarianism), which exists in the environment of formal and informal institutions and is associated with alternative institutions. The latter strengthened, imposed themselves and began to function in society as its determinant!

The quasi-liberal socio-economic reality of Montenegro and its environs, as well as numerous media reports and interviews with famous authors, have further convinced me that we live in a dependent (“*fettered*”, “*neo-hermetic*”) society. It can be defined as a special form of the so-called “contractual society”, in which social mani-

festations are visible and invisible, depending on whether and to what extent social agreements are implemented institutionally or extra-institutionally (bypassing institutions), as well as depending on the level of culture, democracy, morality, self-awareness, social responsibility, personal and group interests, etc.

### 3. ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTION AND DEMOCRACY

To perceive and understand the neoliberal interpretation of democracy and freedom, one historical fact must be recalled. Civilized and civil societies in Europe shared an ideological consensus from the French Revolution of 1788 to the European Revolutions of 1848 that did not distinguish "*liberal democracy*" from "*social democracy*" (Carr, 1947). It was only in 1848 that democratic values were divided into different sides of the political barricades, where they exist to this day. In this fact, by the way, the imaginary "concerns" of liberal democracy are visible (in transitional countries) in the whole society, i.e. visible abuses of such democracy! She can be called without hesitation a competitive (profitable) "democracy". First of all, thanks to the work of strong alternative institutions. Quasi-liberals, who often (when they need it) mistakenly refer to themselves as "liberals", clearly distinguish between a crisis world that exists (to their extent) and a just world (which should exist). In this sense, they point out that "liberal teaching" is allegedly superior "*because of its theoretical completeness and logical consistency*" (Madzar, 2004, p. 256). At the same time, they ignore the fact that under the slogan of "radical and progressive liberalization" since the early 1990s, various dogmas, myths and a specific "*neoliberal culture*" have been created, artificially supported and cultivated. At the same time, neoliberals directly influenced the formation of official economic policy (Delibasic, 2019). As if in developed countries periodically (especially during periods of severe depressions and crises) enhanced measures of centralization are not carried out, as if they do not have strong, flexible and effective state institutions. No matter how strong, tenacious and forced the aforementioned neoliberal dogmas and myths may be, the experience of developed countries shows that without strong institution of state regulation, it is impossible to form effective market, legal and other social institutions capable of punishing the opportunism of market entities and bureaucratic structures. The lack of state regulation is precisely one of the main reasons for the institutional vacuum (and fiasco) in most transition countries and the strengthening of alternative institutions. Democracy and alternative institutions cannot co-exist, because they are mutually exclusive categories!

Developing the ideas of L. von Mises about the interconnectedness of forms of ownership and mechanisms of economic coordination, J. Kornai (1990; 1992) emphasized a great "similarity" between private property and market coordination, as well as their antipodes - state property and bureaucratic coordination. He believed that all other combinations (institutional pluralism - note V.D.) do not have such "proximity". However, the practice of some countries with the transition economy

rejected him: it showed that a deviant relationship between private property and bureaucratic coordination is possible! Of course, the specific (consensus) form (symbiosis) of such a “*mixed economy*” (the so-called “*bureaucratic capitalism*” - Orru et al., 1991, p. 365) was realized through non-market opportunism, mediated (again!) alternative institutions. Much has been said about the “*great achievements of the market and democracy*”. The non-market opportunism he broke the ideological and teleological postulates about democracy and the market (as supposedly “*Siamese twins*”). So was with of democracy can it be if it is under the control of closely directed, privileged and corrupt interests?! That's how it was with a market economy, which was undermined and discredited in the conditions of illegal, uncontrolled and robbery privatization, (“*grabbing*”, „*predatory*“ - note V.D.), opportunist behaviour, asymmetry of information, lack of institutional infrastructure and dominance of closely privileged interests (Stiglitz, 1999). The quasi-liberals persistently and simply “glued” some fragmented, non-critical, apologetic, propaganda, manipulative and pseudo-scientific labels and promises that circulated as supposedly absolute truths. Such self-promotion served society as a positive recommendation, an exemplary model, a landmark and a “lighthouse”. The time and actions of the quasinoliberals clearly showed that all these were only banalities and strict means to achieve the goal, which is called the creation of a stereotype of mass knowledge, despite all the hardships which the masses have experienced.

Ignoring the background of their supposedly “scientific interests”, it was primarily about popularizing a pernicious ideology and pure politics (represented mainly by neo-liberal economic policies)! At the same time, the “new order” has become neither better (more efficient), nor more stable, nor fairer, nor more humane. Why? First of all, because there was no proper and controlled transfer of property rights (public and/or state), because it was blocked by interest groups that had tremendous power (Kornai, 2000, p. 49). However qualitative, quantitative and “cosmetic” the differences between the old and the new political monopoly, its abuses and interest motives, the fact is that social consequences and privileges have multiplied. This means that dirigisme as a phenomenon has survived! The privileged wealthy could not be the bearers of institutional change. They (mostly former communists) got rich precisely thanks to the existence of the so-called “*minimal state*” (Draskovic, V., and Draskovic M., 2012), which allowed its nomenclature to abuse it because of their interests. The neo-liberal “flight” of the former planners to the “market people” was accompanied by neo-elite apologetics that rhetorically exalted abstract (but not mass!) individualism and criticized any (even necessary) form of unity and solidarity (conditionally: collectivism). But economics is characterized by a specific duality on many important issues, which arises from the paradoxical interpretation of institutional contradictions associated with the incorrect prioritization of market or state regulation. In a more general form, this can be expressed through two opposite (alternative) types (mechanisms) of decision-making in the economy and society: individual and collective.

Contradictory theoretical views in economics would not be such an insurmountable problem if the set of individual benefits were logically viewed as the well-being of society as a whole. The problem is the immoral approach to resources, i.e. in non-compliance with several basic criteria of social choice: Pareto optimality, collective rationality, lack of dictate (when one individual chooses for the whole society) and independence from irrelevant alternatives. Beautifully and seductively works the general phrase of the neo-liberals "*to affirm the principle of freedom (primarily market) from any coercion.*" But when you look at practice and see what "their freedom" includes (privileges, opportunism, social pathology, criminal activity, non-market activity, etc.), it becomes clear that the freedom of some (privileged minorities) leads to a wide and branched labyrinth of the unfreedom of others (majority). According to the unwritten quasi-neoliberal recipe, the freedom of the privileged simply and "naturally" turns into coercion, violence, neo-totalitarianism and terror against others! Privatization in most transition economies has shown conclusively that the term "freedom" has often been used in a highly arbitrary manner, following with the doctrine, ideology and policy mentioned, through the operation of kindred interests. It all boiled down to useless rhetoric and empty promises of freedom of enterprise and freedom of private property and markets<sup>2</sup>, without any moral, legal, control, institutional or other restrictions<sup>3</sup>.

#### 4. IMMORAL APPROACH TO RESOURCES

The solution of crisis problems and the clarification of many issues of the development of socio-economic systems has always been the subject of attention of economists. In recent decades, this topic has attracted increased interest, which is associated with major global changes and problems, as well as more frequent crises. For more than three decades, multiple crisis tendencies at all levels and in many ways have been shrouded (wrapped) in a false, paradoxical, contradictory, general, rhetorical, two-standard, contradictory and deceptive neoliberal ideological mantra. The practice has convincingly denied, discredited and demystified it through numerous market failures with catastrophic and lasting consequences. This mantra was initiated and supported by geopolitical, geoeconomic, geostrategic and elemental political discourses and ambitions. It is a constant "idea struggle" of coalitions of interests (the so-called "new elites") against all alternatives in order to win and maintain privileges, power and superiority. The state has consistently been posed as the problem

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<sup>2</sup> K. Polanyi (1990) rightly and sincerely noted that the free market in modern developed countries was formed not by itself (spontaneously), but mainly under the influence of the institution of state regulation, which destroyed corporate and many other feudal restrictions on market freedom.

<sup>3</sup> Many failures, setbacks and tragedies occurred while the "guru" of extreme neo-liberalism M. Friedman repentantly admitted: "*I was wrong, it turned out that the rule of law is probably more elementary than privatization.*" Let's remember, in the early 1990s, he sent the erroneous message to the transition economies: "*Privatize, privatize, and only privatize.*" (Friedman, 1995)

and the market has been posed as the solution, even as quasi-neoliberals have drastically used and abused the resources of the state and society. Further, the alleged "fight of ideas" continued along ideological paths, through deeply self-serving rhetoric of allegedly "free-thinking", "reformist" and abstract promises and justifications, reduced to an unconvincing story about the superiority of everything private over everything that is governmental. At the same time, no one mentioned the presence or differences between private and state monopolies as one of the main market restrictions (Draskovic, 2000, 2018; Draskovic V. et al., 2020; Delibasic, 2016).

The real-world market is far from the Friedmann-Hayek ideal. Without going into the reasons for this situation, there is no doubt that the main reasons are institutional in nature, as well as the impossibility of an absolute separation of political and economic power, i.e. separation of government from business. The socialist phenomenon of the "*bureaucratic market*" (Gaidar's term, 1990) is still active in most transitional countries, only the methods of its functioning have been improved. One of them is the so-called "*clan economy*" (my expression).<sup>4</sup> J. Robinson's (1979) statement fits well here: "*Economists' answers are questions for politicians.*" It goes without saying that these answers should not lend legitimacy to false teachings. Politics directly influenced the creation of a mutated monopolistic-bureaucratic order, the essence of which is in the so-called "*predatory state*" model<sup>5</sup>. This is a mixture of the pursuit of profit and rent-oriented motivation of economic agents (and not only them!). It was this model that allowed numerous deformations, usurpations and manipulations, which led to the colossal enrichment of a minority of privileged persons and the impoverishment of the majority of the people. This "model" in all respects contradicts the abstract neoliberal theoretical model, as well as the model of evolutionary development formulated by D. North (1990), R. Nelson & S. Winter (1982), P. Pelican (1967) and others.

Obviously, quasi-neoliberals do not know enough about economic theory and are not interested in it. They don't even mind the so-called "market fundamentalism", with all its vices, because they made a very big profit on it ... Their interests were and remain the main goal! Old (socialist) habits, rules of the game and privileges have been inherited, which have been raised to the highest level and formalized in the power of alternative institutions as specific and criminal meta-institutions, i.e. "*alliances of interests*" and "*violence against institutionalization*" (Draskovic M. et al., 2017; Draskovic, 2001). They are similar to the so-called "*total institutions with explicit control*" (see Goffman, 1968, p. 41). Within our then regional framework (Montenegro and its environs), for decades, some quasi-neoliberal "gurus" at various "scientific forums" meditated and propagated one-sidedness, half-truths, vagueness

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<sup>4</sup> Used in jargon: A person who hides other people's property and business

<sup>5</sup> Its antipode is the so-called "development state" (see Evans, 1993), in which national resources are rationally, institutionally and economically directed towards dynamic economic development.

and virtual "development recipes" that metaphysically fit into a system of organized lies, which, what very interesting, criticized!

Regional neo-liberals often asked provocative and nonsensical questions, such as: "*Why are people against liberalization and freedom*"? Their "thoughts" that the biggest problems of the transition period are "*distrust of business*", "*fear of the growth of individualism*" and "*belief in demagogues*" are ironic, cynical and irritating. However, they wouldn't pass the responsibility test. These are just a few of the selected sayings of the "neoliberal gurus" who have sat next to in state chairs (managers) for decades, showing of false intelligence, propagating persistently the profane phrase of a "minimal state" that should be a life-saving solution. We entered the 21st century with the same but much sharper "damned question" that M. Menshikov (1902) asked 120 years ago: "*Where will the redundant hands go*" (unemployed and beggars - ed.)? This simply limits the freedom of people and their labour potential. Paradoxically, the more history moves away (time passes), the more the general and material security of the majority decreases, the circle (and concentration) of (too) rich expands, as well as economic inequality among people. Where are people and what are they waiting for? How much did they schedule? Will the saviour spirit, voice and reason of humanity ever awaken?

## **5. MODERN WORLD AND STATE**

Building a modern, civilized and sustainable society is impossible without an active, flexible and efficient economic and social (primarily institutional, security and environmental) role of the state. All alternative approaches are contrary to common sense, reason and practice of the most developed countries. At the same time, it is clear that the question of the institutional relationship between market and state redistribution is open and depends on the specific choice of their combination in individual countries. We live in a world of one big and universal paradox: too fast changes, in which many old dogmas and negatives do not change, or change slowly, and many even become aggravated and new ones appear. Starting from the lack of a culture of dialogue and knowledge, avoiding work, order and responsibility, ignoring dissidents and various pressures on opinion and choice, through blurring reality, deceiving the public, plagiarism, inflating diplomas and ignorance, to denying and re-writing history, forcibly changing identity, great stratification and separation, the collapse of moral and cultural values, the sale of public resources, etc. The modern world most often confirms, but sometimes (partially) also denies the correctness of the statement of Heraclitus "everything changes". In this and such a world, after three and a half decades of stubborn, programmed, sophisticated and most importantly self-serving echoes of the same immoral repetition and philosophizing of quasi-neoliberals, who fell silent during more and more frequent periods of crisis, but they resurrect with their fictitious and abstract propaganda of what - they themselves perfectly understand - does not exist, except for their predatory desires, illusions, quasi-

contexts and brain cavities ... After all, they promote something that often contradicts with constant sources of their existence and/or their enrichment!

The public sector is not an ideal regulatory mechanism because, among other things, it is unable to transform resources into public goods in a way that satisfies the needs of the majority of consumers of these goods. Because people in all activities, even in politics, have and follow their own interests and preferences. Political power, even in the so-called “democratic societies”, “naturally” (according to the logic of the organized interests of small privileged groups) passes into the hands of political leaders (representatives of these groups), who defeat the unorganized and unprotected (or poorly protected) interests of large latent groups in elections. This is contrary to majority rule (and therefore real democracy). Thus, relatively small but influential lobbying groups often receive various benefits and privileges (tax, customs, monopoly, credit, information, etc.) at the expense of the population (taxpayers). This is what serves as the basis for their unreasonable enrichment. In all societies, there are unfair, lobbying, sociopathological and undemocratic ways to pursue the personal economic interests of those in power and small groups of lobbying businesses that are closely associated with the state and support it. These are the paradoxical ways in which the minority exploits the majority in various perfidious ways, and the majority has made this possible through their votes, through the many imperfections of the political process.

It is known that in addition to legal violence, which is in the monopoly of public authorities (Weber), there is also the so-called "residual violence" that accompanies decision-making functions and is associated with the irrationality of politics. The main task of any democratic regime is to find forces capable of effectively resisting this residual (in fact: privileged) violence. By definition, the state must effectively perform the function of managing institutions. Otherwise, it may lead to quasi-institutionalization. When the state consciously assumes the role of frustrating coordination with parallel successes of “*life projects of individuals*” (A. Sen’s term), it is clear that these are systemic deformations of the functions of the institutional mechanisms of social action. Let us recall that the main functions of institutions proposed by D. North (after: Draskovic, 2005, pp. 49-50) are: limiting the behaviour of various subjects (economic, legal, political, etc.), saving their time and effort in decision-making, reducing transaction costs, assistance in adapting to change, minimizing risk, uncertainty and entropy, ensuring the implementation, connection and coordination of economic relations, resources, actors and activities, ensuring the implementation of contracts and collecting penalties for non-performance, facilitating social, legal, economic and interpersonal communication, ensuring reliable protection against opportunistic behaviour and providing driving motives for human actions. If these functions are blocked, usurped and abused by certain holders of power, one can rightfully speak of institutional violence (see, for example, Cerovic, 2012).

## CONCLUSION

After all of the above, how can one believe in a stable and acceptable world of G. Simon, which should be better than the existing one? In the existing world, for example, in Montenegro, only after three and a half decades later there was a change of government. Without going into an assessment of the quality of these changes (the formation of the so-called "expert government", party disagreements and numerous systemic blockades), it was expected that the new majority would begin accelerated institutional changes. However, the political promises and rhetoric were not kept. People's expectations were deceived. A year later there was a new (paradoxical, but expected) political change and an unusual construction (the so-called "minority government") - outside the framework of the winning parliamentary majority. It remains to be seen whether this new experiment will lead to any institutional changes (which I sincerely doubt). Judging by the experience, it will be more about the political and party struggle for power than about major institutional changes. Various institutional blockades and crises support this assertion. The reasons for this condition can be analysed. But for the purposes of this article, it suffices to state that we are talking about the combined influence of political authoritarianism and corruption, the corresponding party combinatorics, the interests of the oligarchy and international factors.

It is impossible to talk about institutional changes in the context of the political struggle for power and the lack of elementary public consent. Probably, we should mention the deficit of one lofty human feeling - patriotism. Expressed patriotism would probably greatly relativize the effect of many of the new shackles I write about in this manuscript. The lack of patriotism, i.e., surplus false patriotism is one of the important reasons for the institutional fiasco. As well as various ways of "measuring" and manifesting patriotism (priority of personal interests, the desire for power and *"hatred and ignorance of others and the rejection of others in what is required for oneself"* (Jergovic, 2022)). But, on a transitional path (process) that is promoted and allegedly conceived from socialist political authoritarianism through post-socialist institutionalization to political pluralism and democracy - little has been done.

It is much easier to point out and describe a problem than to suggest specific ways to solve it. That's why I tried to make some suggestions. It is clear that the main problem lies in the functioning of strong alternative institutions that support the brake system of privileges, corruption and the dominance of the rich "elite" over the impoverishment of the people, state and society. It is clear that the so-called "new elites" created laws for others and exceptions for themselves. The instruments of violence were distributed among the elite groups. In this sense, we suggest liquidating alternative institutions and privileged "elites".

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