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
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## Social Network Sites and Young People’s Developing Identities

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### ABSTRACT

*The present research aims at finding out how young people are possibly affected in the continuing formation of their sociocultural identity by their use of social websites such as Facebook with a focus on the following areas: online/offline relationships, online/offline participation in civic activities (international or national), online/offline consumership, and online/ of-fline pursuit of professional goals. The*

*study also probes attitudes toward other cultural groups, the Turkish Cypriots in particular, and possible future co-existence with them, in light of a still divided Cyprus. Based on 27 semi-structured individual interviews with students of the University of Nicosia, the results revealed that while the majority of the respondents used Facebook, some consciously chose not to be on Facebook. As to consumption, traditional media advertisements seemed to prevail, although online purchasing is gaining popularity particularly through websites such as Amazon.com or e-bay rather than under the influence of Facebook advertisements. The results also showed that there was a lack of trust in political parties and institutions, all created in Cyprus during its last 50 years of independence. As to online/offline civic activities (Causes on Facebook), there was a preference of local causes over global issues and avoiding to contribute to the public sphere offline. Moreover, it appeared that social sites were primarily used to strengthen offline social networks. The results on Otherness and more especially, the Turkish-Cypriot “Others”, revealed that most students stressed their preference for Greek Cypriots as friends and admitted of thinking in terms of “us” as the Greek Cypriots, and “them” as the Turkish Cypriots.*

**KEYWORDS:** *New media, Facebook, Identity development, Youth, Cyprus.*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Since their inception, social network sites such as Facebook, MySpace and Twitter have become increasingly popular. With these sites, not only are people able to communicate with their friends and families without geographical barriers, but also connect with strangers based on shared interests, or common language, or shared identities. While these sites appeal to different languages and countries, and their popularity changes over time, according to Web-Strategist.com, about 400 million people around the world actively use Facebook, and almost half of them use Facebook every day. Furthermore, about 55% of the users ages between 12-17 have created profiles on social network sites, and this percentage is increased to 64% of teens between 15-17 (Boyd, 2008).

As young people are extensive users of Internet-based technology, recent studies focusing on young people and their consumption of the Internet have high-lighted a wide range of social issues, with a growing recognition of the impact of youth Internet use on their identity development. This research aims at finding out how young people are possibly affected in the continuing formation of their socio-cultural identity by their use of social websites such as Facebook with a focus on the following areas: creating virtual relationships versus actual offline relationships, awareness and possible online and offline participation in civic activities (international or national), political awareness and participation, cyber consumership versus of-fline consumership and possible pursuit of professional goals online versus in real

life. The above areas have been chosen as some of the core components of ethnicity and lifestyle essential to the contemporary socio-cultural identity of young people.

## **1. SOCIAL NETWORK SITES AND FACEBOOK**

Boyd and Ellison (2008, p. 2) define social network sites as “Web-based services that allow individuals to: – construct a public or semi-public profile with a bounded system – articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection – view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system”. While network sites vary in their ability to incorporate new technologies such as mobile connectivity and blogging, their main technological features are fairly standard. The key element consists of visible profiles that display a list of chosen friends who are also users of the site. The profile is created based on answers to questions such as age, location, education and interests. Facebook also encourages users to add photographs and multimedia content to enhance their profiles. Users can update their profiles anytime and notify their friends about the changes. Network sites also have security/privacy features which affect the extent of visibility of users’ profiles. MySpace lets the users decide whether their profile can be viewed by the public or friends only. On Facebook, users can join networks organized by parameters such as city of residence, workplace or school, and Facebook allows users to choose whether they give others belonging to the same community access to their profile.

In addition to creating profiles, users are asked to identify others in the system who are in their offline social circles under the terms “Friends”, “Contacts”, or “Fans”. The public display of the friends list is crucial as it enables viewers to traverse the network by clicking through the lists. Most network sites also allow users to leave comments on their friends’ profile or send private e-mail messages, similar to most webmail applications. Facebook has the applications of the Wall, Pokes and Status. The Wall is a space on every user’s profile page that allows friends to post messages for the user to see; Pokes allows users to send a virtual “poke” to each other, and Status lets users to inform their friends of their whereabouts and actions. Depending on privacy settings, anyone who can see a user’s profile can also view that user’s Wall and Status.

Additionally, Facebook has the Facebook Platform, a framework for software developers to create applications that interact with core Facebook features. These applications range from Gifts, allowing users to send virtual gifts to each other; Marketplace, allowing users to post free classified ads; Events, letting users inform their friends about upcoming events; and Video, letting users share homemade videos with one another.

Facebook has also opened up a new realm of possibilities with the Causes application. The Causes application enables members of the Facebook community to

join together, recruit supporters, and donate money to thousands of different charity organizations, relief groups and political campaigns. The idea behind Causes is to take advantage of the vast circles of online friends connected through Facebook to reach potential donors and volunteers on a more personal level. Since the launch in May 2007, 60 million people have started using Causes and over 250,000 causes have been created about every topic from halting global warming to supporting arts education, and the application has raised \$9 million overall. The Causes claims that this application essentially democratizes activism by empowering users of Facebook who want to leverage their network on Facebook to effect positive change. Any Facebook user can create a cause, recruit their friends into that cause, keep everybody in the cause up-to-speed on issues and media coverage related to the cause, and, most importantly, raise money directly through the cause for any U.S. registered nonprofit or Canadian registered charity.

## **2. BRIDGING ONLINE AND OFFLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS**

While social network sites help users to establish and make visible their social networks, and connections between strangers can be made, these sites are primarily used to communicate with people who are already in their offline social network, central or peripheral. Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe (2007) analyzed Facebook as a convenient and effective means of maintaining and solidifying existing offline social circles. Online friends usually share some common offline relationship albeit these online friendships may be weak. Online and offline interactions interface in such a way that Facebook users search for people who are already part of their social life more than browse for strangers to expand their social experience (Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield, 2006).

## **3. DIGITAL MEDIA AND FOSTERING CIVIC PARTICIPATION**

Research on the role of media in youth civic participation has argued that the traditional approach to examining media and civic participation considers youth as a passive audience and has largely focused on media effects and formal political participation (Bell, 2005). Instead of communicating through the mass media, many young people are turning to digital media for information. Researchers are encouraged to look to ways in which young people make selective use of media, particularly new digital technologies, and incorporate media content into their lives in civic ways. As the Internet has provided a new way of creating communities that extend beyond geographic boundaries (Kraut et al., 2002), it can be a new venue for youth to engage in civic and volunteering activities across local communities and national frontiers, to learn about political life and to experience the challenges of democratic participation (Camino and Zeldin, 2002).

The possible effect of social network sites on mobilizing youth, or rather the Facebook effect on the American political system, became clear in 2008, as Facebook teamed up with ABC and Saint Anselm College to allow users to give live feedback about the "back to back" Republican and Democratic January 5th debates. Facebook users could participate in debate groups organized around specific topics, register to vote and send in questions. Over one million people installed the Facebook application - US politics. The "Facebook effect", as Newsweek calls it, demonstrates that social network sites can increase youth mobilization in election season by creating a way for students to share and access campaign information and support candidates.

As discussed before, the Causes application on Facebook has also become a new tool to involve people in charity and volunteering activities. According to All-Facebook.com, Causes has 6,244,688 weekly active users and 23,578,039 monthly active users. Facebook users can participate in recruiting, spreading awareness, leading dialogue, signing petitions and fundraising from others. In addition to individual activists, nonprofit organizations have also used Causes to build communities of supporters around the issues they work on. And a number of causes directly address youth related issues or try to appeal to youth. Red Cross Youth, for example, has 154,359 site visitors who have registered themselves in the Red Cross database as future volunteers.

While this evidence demonstrates the potential role of social network sites in facilitating civic engagement, some have gone as far as suggesting that a 'Youth civic culture' is emerging on the Internet (Montgomery et al., 2004), Livingstone cautions that "*a few studies are charting interesting initiatives using the Internet to stimulate young people's participation, holding out the promise of new opportunities through instances of 'best practice', although it remains unclear how and by whom these could be evaluated or more widely implemented*" (2003, p. 151). More research apparently is needed to assess youth civic engagement - looking to see what activities and issues interest youth, what participating venues youth seems to prefer, and whether they are engaged in different ways than previously thought.

The diversification and pervasiveness of the media today are one strong source of meanings and influences which cannot be ignored. More especially, discussing directly youth and online/ offline civic and community participation and about their perspectives on related issues, such as politics and activism, will help to develop further understanding these issues in such a way that values youth participation. On the other hand, Hafez (2007, p. 113) believes that "*People who spend a lot of time romping around in the global spaces of the Internet can expand their knowledge of the world in all directions. But there is no guarantee of authenticity.*" And the present research attempts to obtain indications as to where Greek-Cypriot youth stands in relation to these contradictory, at times interpretations of young people's relationship with social websites in particular.

Of course, it must not be left unsaid that social websites themselves, and Facebook in particular, have been topics of contradiction. Facebook has been blocked intermittently in several countries including Syria, China, Vietnam and Iran and has also been banned at many places of work to stop employees from wasting their working time. “Privacy”, according to Wikipedia (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook>), has also been an issue and it has been compromised several times. On another, even more serious account there have been warnings, like that of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster Vincent Nicholas, England’s top Catholic bishop, that Facebook and other social network sites may lead teens to commit suicide, with the Archbishop warning that “*social networking sites can damage intimate relationships and leave teenagers without strong social ties*” (Ibid).

#### **4. ONLINE CONSUMERSHIP AND PROFESSIONAL PURSUITS**

Consumption in today’s society has a significant impact on and meaning for the individual: it becomes a means by which people communicate and interact. “*Consumption is part of children's and young people's education and socialization, and plays a role in the development of identity and self-image*” (Benn, 2004, p. 108). Although encouraged to be informed and rational consumers, with the availability and easy access of online commerce, consumerism is likely to be foremost characterized by globalization. And social network sites can be used to promote particular aspects of consumption connected to both material and non-material aspects of life. Facebook launched Gifts on February 8, 2007. This allows users to send virtual gifts to their friends that appear on the recipient’s profile. Gifts cost \$1.00 each to purchase and a personalized message can be attached to each gift. Additionally on May 14, 2007, Facebook launched Marketplace, which lets users post free classified advertisements, an additional consumer service, besides the advertisements listed in its pages linking the user to different relevant sites for ordering goods. Job information also seems to be available on Facebook as different employers may advertise their personnel needs and vacancies, different groups may be involved in providing job and professional information and ad links may also lead to job advertisements.


#### **5. THE PRESENT RESEARCH PROJECT**

In Cyprus, 82% of the population aged 16-24 has skills in using the computer and the Internet (Eurostats, 2009). A study conducted on college and university students in Cyprus (Papaioannou and Roussou, 2009) has found that about 89% of the student population access the Internet everyday, resulting in an average time of 2.2 hours on the Internet daily. With regard to social network sites, whereas information from the Internet as to the use of “My Space” in Cyprus does not seem to be forthcoming, figures as to Facebook use in Cyprus ([www.allfacebook.com](http://www.allfacebook.com)) appear to be quite informative from different angles, as follows: Number of users on Facebook in

Cyprus: 258 060 Number of male users on Facebook in Cyprus: 133 380 Number of female users on Facebook in Cyprus: 113 580 Penetration in Cyprus: 23.79 % Online penetration in Cyprus: 77.03 % Further information as to age-group use of Facebook in Cyprus gives us the following percentages:

### User-Age Distribution - Facebook Cyprus

13-15=11%  
 16-17=9%  
 18-24=30%  
 25-34=30%  
 35-44=12%  
 45-54=5%  
 55-64=2%  
 65+=1%



The fact, that the biggest percentages of Facebook users - 30% - are age groups 18-24 and 25-35 was very good justification for exploring the issue of social websites and young people's developing identities. Use of the Internet and social websites in particular have been reinforcing the theory of social and cultural globalization, a spirit-of-the-times development which essentially bears on the transformation continuum of collective consciousness into social representations.

The term "collective consciousness" ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective\\_consciousness](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_consciousness)) seems to be going from "solidarity attitudes and memes" to "extreme behaviours like groupthink or herd behaviour." It has developed as a way of describing how an entire community comes together to share similar values. According to Castells (2004, p. 57), on the other hand, it is proposed that "*formally, a representation can be characterized as the relation between three elements: subjects, or carriers of the representation; an object, activity, or idea that is represented; and a project of a social group within which the representation makes sense.*" Many thinkers of course admit that the theorization of social representations was inspired by Emile Durkheim's notion of collective representations.

How much then do social (collective) representations go into the making, the shaping and reshaping of young people's identities today, in the context of a territorialized historicity versus the regular and extensive use of social websites that offer them common experiences, activities, projects, ideas and challenges? An impressive scale of life experiences to entertain, to train in sharing to train in communication transborderwise? A lived world – online/offline – with specific themes that await to be conceptualized in the lifestyle of young populations?

These are common questions that matter for all youth today. For Cyprus youth, they are more significant, as the island has been invaded, partitioned and semi-occupied for more than one generation now – 37 years. A period during which the two

main ethnicities in the island – i.e. Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have been living in territorially divided areas. Ethnicity is a powerful pillar of national, social and cultural identity. According to Manuel Castells (2004, p. 57) “*ethnicity is being specified as a source of meaning and identity, to be melted not with other ethnicities, but under broader principles of cultural self-definition, such as religion, nation and gender*”. On the other hand, the historical context in which people develop and progress plays a very important role in shaping the collective memory of people. These reasons provide additional challenge for looking into the identity and the collective aspirations, lifestyles and empowerment of young people in Cyprus today, as a recent bi-communal research report conducted by the University of Nicosia and the Cyprus Social and Economic Research Centre (KADEM) did recently (Overview, 2009: United Nations Development Programme, “Youth in Cyprus: Aspirations, Lifestyles & Empowerment”, [hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/cyprus\\_hdr\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/cyprus_hdr_2009_en.pdf)). The research was conducted between 2007-2009, as a part of the Youth Dialogue Project supported by the United Nations Development Programme, and even though some of the conclusions of this report may not bear directly on the present project, they do give us an idea of the profile of Cypriot youth. With regard to the identity of young Cypriots, the researchers consider that:

– “The issue of identity among Cypriot youth is neither simple nor clear-cut and is complicated by the island’s history of colonization, identification with the respective ‘mother countries’ and the enduring division between the two main communities.”

– So approximately two-thirds of youth from the two communities felt more “Mediterranean” than “Middle Eastern or European”.

– A closer examination of what the term “Cypriot” signifies to young people highlights that, a striking 86% of Greek-Cypriots and a corresponding 55% of Turkish-Cypriots, when using the term “Cypriot” refer exclusively to Greek-Cypriots or Turkish-Cypriots, respectively. Thus, the term Cypriot seems to be used by most young people as synonymous to their own ethnic community and not to all Cypriots.

Further findings in this report indicated that the family still has a strong hold on young people, a fact that may need to be more balanced with the individual empowerment of young people and that many young people in Cyprus feel they are cast in the role of subordinate citizens by the political agendas of political parties and institutions.

## **6. OBJECTIVES**

The present research aimed at exploring the different dimensions of the developing identities of Cypriot youth, in modern Cyprus, a member of the European Union, in the context of their historical and geographical realities, in association with

the use of social network websites such as Facebook and possibly My Space, even though from existing statistics the second one does not seem to have many users in Cyprus. Gannouchi, in Castells (2004, p. 13) reminds us that “*the only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our history and our civilization*”. Circumstances being what they are as we saw above, identity is a challenging theme especially among the developing young population of Cypriots today. This challenge was treated by the present researchers in two previous studies, quoting from which will further place the present research in focus.

In a research paper entitled “The Internet and Young People’s Sociability: Continuums or Reversals?” (2006), one of the main findings associated with the sociability of young people was that “spending more time online would lead to more discussions with friends and wanting to belong to a club or society, but also increased verbal aggression and a tendency for depression”(p.203). In a second research project on “Young People and New Communication Technologies: Cross-media Consumption and its Effects on Cognitive and Affective Development” (2008), some of the conclusions seem to be of interest to this study: In spite of Europeanization and globalization, the celebration of the end of nationalism, as mentioned earlier, seems to be premature” (p. 256). And “*One of the most worrisome aspects though in the results of this survey which deserves further research is young people’s avoidance to contribute to the public sphere in real life, as very few seemed to be active in any specific social, political, or cultural areas*” (p. 264). The focus in this project being identity of young Greek Cypriots, in association with the use of social websites, especially Facebook, it was considered worthwhile to attempt tracing any possible elements of “collective” identity, as Melluci in Escobar (1992, p. 72), defines it, “*a shared understanding of ‘what we can and will do’*”, or whether in spite of the common use of social websites like Facebook where communication can be frequent, ubiquitous and systematic, this sense of collectiveness or group identity lacks in depth or continuity, either online or offline. Additionally, to repeat well-accepted statements, from the sociological point of view, identities are considered to be constructions, and as Castells (2004) proposes they can be constructed from materials of history, geography, biology, productive and reproductive institutions, collective memory, personal fantasies, power apparatuses and religious revelations.

## **7. METHOD**

Having a backdrop of research with a statistical thrust more than a qualitative approach, it was considered that a qualitative approach through an openended conversation with each interviewee would be used. Such effort to investigate trends, tendencies, or even indications as to the identity of young users of social websites could give us a different perspective perhaps to the identities of young Greek Cypriots. Even though interviews may lack in generalizability, they can give the opportunity to the interviewees to talk about their lived world, express their views

and opinions in their own words and talk about their hopes and their expectations in life. Again even if qualitative interviewing lacks in the confirmation of quantitative data validity, they offer the interviewer (and the wider public) the opportunity to understand the world from the subjects' points of view, to unfold the meanings of people's experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations (Kvale, 1996). And as the objectives of the present paper are theme-oriented, the personal interview was considered a suitable research technique to investigate the feelings, the meanings and the inter-relations between online and offline conceptualizations connected to the developing identities of young people.

A series of interviews were conducted with students of University of Nicosia, aged between 18 – 25. Twenty-seven students were chosen at random, 17 female and 10 male. The sample included one Turkish Cypriot and four exchange students studying in the Erasmus programme. Seven were M.A. students and 20 were undergraduate students.

The agenda of questions was semi-structured, with diversions in the dialogue between the interviewers and the interviewees, as the construction of their life world realities had to be made through the linguistic conversations which sought to dialectically cover, as mentioned in the introduction of the present paper, but were not limited to the following areas:

- Use of Facebook and My Space, vs. other media, especially television,
- Habits of consumership,
- Job searching and advancement of professional development,
- Voting and political participation,
- Participation in civic and action groups,
- Online and Offline,
- Attitudes towards Turkish-Cypriots and other cultures in the island,
- Attitudes towards a future co-existence with Turkish Cypriots in a unified state.

The above areas (or themes of conversation) were chosen as important aspects of the lifestyle and behaviour of young people in Cyprus today, in the particular political and technological culture in which they have to adapt and grow, with a continuous effort to situate dialectically their human activities in a social and historical context. Cyprus culture today is going through a period of tension and transition for all the population, but is certainly more taxing for young adolescents who are called to move on from the status of an islander to that of a European citizen, from a state of their country's partition to a plausible solution of the Cyprus problem, and from the analog media of radio and television to digital technology and the ever enlarging embrace of Internet-based communication technologies.

Numbers in personal interviews are of no primary consequence, but the qualitative text which may develop can impart to the reader the feelings and attitudes of

the interviewees as well as their conceptualization of the practices to which they confess and about which they discuss with the interviewer. So it is the responses and the interpretations of phenomena which are explored in the entire framework of the objectives established by the research.

## **8. INDICATIONS AND FINDINGS**

### **Use of Facebook and My Space**

Initially it was established that: 21 out of 27 do not use “My Space”; 5 never use Facebook; 22 use Facebook and 3 do not watch television.

### **Consumership**

The types of products they usually buy are the following:

#### **Online:**

Clothes, tickets, books, books from Amazon.com, electronics, gifts, flowers, shoes, watches, jewelry, and DVDs and CDs from e-bay and from Amazon.com

#### **Offline:**

Fashion, shoes, bags, jewelry, food, bus and air tickets, and university books

Some of the problems they mention in buying online are issues of security, theft, having a credit card (which some do not) and they also seek confirmation from friends, before ordering. Most of the responses about following sites of ads in Facebook were negative. But they do buy from online ads: *“If I buy online, I go to e-bay or Amazon. Still I buy more offline. But online shopping is a good alternative for me”*<sup>1</sup>. *“No, I have never bought anything through Facebook. I don’t trust the companies advertised there. I am thinking of getting an internet card to use only for the Internet.”* *“I have noticed those ads. But never bought anything. I don’t believe in the Internet. I don’t think it is reliable. Yes, I have heard people buying from Amazon.com, but never tried myself.”* And *“I have never bought anything from Facebook but I used to buy books from an Italian website. Books that are difficult to find. I prefer to buy things offline because I like to see physical things. I prefer to go to stores and touch things, even for books.”*

The above tenor was almost uniform throughout all the answers as to online shopping. Physical contact with the products seemed to be preferable for most interviewees and some went so far as to say that if they spent money buying online things which were no good, their “dad” could be “mad”, reminding us of the strong ties in

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<sup>1</sup> All the comments and quotes are taken from the series of interviews given to the authors, Nayia Roussou and Tao Papaioannou recorded during December, 2009.

the Cypriot family today and the need for more empowerment and independence of young people. The epitome about buying online versus offline is summed up in the following two lines, perhaps: “You can’t always trust online advertising. You need to see the products with your own eyes”.

### **Pursuing Job Interests**

Some respondents did check the internet for either short-term jobs or for professional employment.

Three mentioned JOBCYPRUS.COM, while one interviewee was trying to build his own blog. One felt that he “*was not comfortable putting his CV online*” in an effort to find a job and another one mentioned that some of his friends found jobs like playing in a band or working in a coffee-shop, while a third one found a job in modeling. The whole discussion brought to the surface a general distrust in job advertisements online, except for the Cyprus government site, from which one respondent got a job in the police force. They looked for jobs more offline, in the traditional media of newspapers or magazines, even though one interviewee stated that she was amazed that some of her classmates in Cyprus only used newspapers and magazines as sources for jobs.

### **Voting and Civic Engagement, Online and Offline**

Sixteen interviewees stated that they vote systematically in political elections and a good number stated that they belong to either online or offline groups. Very few belonged to both. More analytically, as to voting decisions, there was a generally strong feeling that somebody who “respects” his or her country must vote, or they would vote “*to make sure that the suitable person gets the position*”. But that was the main interest of the sample in the political life of the country. They mainly avoided belonging to political parties, with about two exceptions and were critical of political leaders and institutions, in a very direct and critical manner: “*I am against political partyism, because I don’t believe they can be of any help to you or to any campaign. The political groups care about promoting their party above all and usually lead to nationalism.*” But the only Turkish-Cypriot participating in the project was very definitive about political affiliations, in his answer about political involvement, in contrast to his voting habits, for which he had good reasons: “*Yes, because I have always been interested in politics, I join these groups in real life as well. No, I have never voted in elections. I live in the Northern side of Cyprus and there is Turkish control from Turkey*”.

### **Online Group Involvement:**

In spite of the respondents’ disinterest and distance from political involvement, they seemed to be positive in participating in philanthropic activities online such as

joining groups on violence against women, minors and animals, groups about health issues, cancer patients support groups, or signing petitions as in the case of the stealing in December, 2009, of the corpse of the late Cypriot president, Dr. Tassos Papadopoulos. Two were also active (one on the waning side) in Greek-Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot rapprochement groups. Offline they seemed to contribute to philanthropic money errands, blood donations, recycling, the Red Cross, AIDS support groups, the bi-communal platform, and animal and environment protection groups, while three respondents stated they had personal hobbies like writing verses (and joining a relevant online group) or dance and theater activities. Their civic participation did not seem to extend to global “Causes”, either on Facebook, as a social website, or on any other appropriate sites, where global issues such as starvation of children, or crucial environmental or economic issues were dealt with. Their public sphere interests seemed to be limited to their local realities and possibilities with an absence of a “campaigning” spirit either online or offline.

### **Relationships with Turkish Cypriots**

The interviewees seemed to have met either in the university, or earlier in life with Turkish-Cypriots, but the theme running throughout the interviews was one of skepticism and mistrust, not so much because of the young people themselves, but because of the events that had occurred in 1974.

Paradoxically enough, their meetings with Turkish Cypriots were in real life not online - online, they chose not to keep contact with them, even though they could have done so fairly easily. Apparently because of (admitted) prejudice in many of their statements which we propose to look at in the section that follows on the discussion of the results and indications derived from the 27 interviews of the project.

## **9. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND INDICATIONS**

The method chosen for this exploratory research project, as stated already, does not depend on statistical data, as the sample was too small for any statistically meaningful or valid conclusions. But this being a qualitative research report, the intensity, the phraseology and the frequency of the statements made by the interviewees provide a background which can give us indications of how young adolescent Cypriots formulate their identities today in a changing world and in a changing Cyprus, with the active inclusion in their life world, of online social websites like Facebook.

Cypriots, because of their geographical location and their multiple community constituents, have always had the tendency to have multiple identities. But on the Greek-Cypriot side, through different research projects in the last ten years, more especially after the invasion and occupation of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, one can

observe a gradually crystallizing identity which came through in this series of interviews as well.

The interviews established, for a start that the majority of the interviewees (22 out of 27) use Facebook and the majority again (21) do not use My Space.

Quite a number (14) do buy online but most do it through other websites like eBay or Amazon.com, not through advertisement links on Facebook. But both those who buy online and those who do not, have expressed strong reservations as to purchases on the Internet with regard to quality of products, safety of ordering without having a corporeal sense of the product and the disadvantages mostly, versus the advantages of ordering online, instead of buying locally.

Not many tried to find jobs online and even those who did only used the official government site or confessed to finding subsidiary jobs, like offhand modeling or serving coffee in a café or playing in a band. Regarding their interest and participation in different causes online, ten of them were involved in different groups on issues, for example, protection of animals, the Red Cross, anti-cancer, Internet addiction, protection of the environment. Interestingly, there was one group that aimed at collecting signatures about the stealing of the corpse of former Cyprus president Tassos Papadopoulos; the Turkish-Cypriot interviewee was with groups with political interests and an exchange student from the U.S. with a “Back to School supply” charity collection in his own country. These interviewees were not involved in relevant or other civic activities or causes offline, except for the Turkish-Cypriot and one Greek-Cypriot who are also involved with political groups offline.

Some of the comments of those interviewees who do not join causes online are worth noting: *“Causes, I don’t find them interesting.”* Or: *“I guess I like to be approached instead of seeking out people interested in common causes with me.”* *“I don’t see the point. What I do and what I contribute don’t go well with those (environmental) groups on Facebook...I don’t think they are useful. There is usually no interaction and you are just a member.”* *“I always give money to Radio Marathon. This is better than donating money online. You see where the money is going. The exchange student from the U.S. pointed a finger at older people running organizations: “I also belong to a breast cancer group in real life aside from causes and philanthropic events online, although I don’t directly work with them. I prefer to establish a cause on my own. When you work with these organizations run by older people, they are used to working in certain ways, I’d like to go above and beyond.”*

Contrariwise, some were in favour of online involvement, not offline: *“Online, yes (belonging to groups) but not offline.”* *“I’m too tired when I’m done with my work and clicking buttons is easier.”* And political involvement even though very rare, when present, was expressed both online and offline: *“Yes, I do belong to a political party and I also join it on Facebook. It is easier on Facebook as you decide the hours you are going to contact the group yourself, as you may be busy with different things during the day.”*

This lack of political interest and participation seems to resonate the conclusion of Hafez (2007, p. 100) that *“there is a chasm between increasing international interaction and the Net’s meager political relevance and power o mobilize. This web creates a virtual world which often lacks a corresponding real-world counterpart.”*

On another account, one interviewee (an M.A. student) belonged to a group where they managed their own restaurant and graded each other for the plates they served. She started off with 800 friends and then limited them to 140, but couldn’t really live without Facebook, her corporeal friends being very limited. Actually at one point she paused and asked: *“Do you think this is a psychological thing?”* Another inter-viewee (a working professional) had a virtual adopted fish pet which she fed regularly, but confessed to loving her actual house pet more than the virtual one. One would wonder if they did reveal their real identity on Facebook during these activities.

The general feeling one gets from the self-stated interests of the interviewees in participating in organized civic interest groups or organizations is a negative impression. This lack of interest of course on behalf of young people in civic activities is today a world phenomenon. In Cyprus it has also been established by the Cyprus Human Development Report (2009, p. 87):*“The largest percentage of participants by far (55% of Greek-Cypriots and 48% of Turkish-Cypriots) admitted that they did not actively participate in any organization or association.”*

Regarding the political interest and involvement of the interviewees in the political life as expressed in voting, out of the 16 who stated voters, some of the interesting comments were as follows: *“If you respect your country, your traditions, give your opinion through voting.” “In Cyprus, if you belong to a political party you don’t want to publicly show it. It will limit your career.”* An exchange student said: *“I used to vote, not now, as I have been away from my country for some time.”*

Some voted what their parents did, some were independent in their voting decisions.

Nine interviewees stated they belonged to groups only offline, but aside from two who were involved with bi-communal activities and two with politics (both online and offline) the rest were involved with dancing and the theater, blood donation, radio marathon donations hobbies, protection of animals and the environment, recycling, breast cancer activities. A mixture, in other words, of personal interests and civic engagement on a transitional basis. As to their relationships with friends online and offline, most of them, even those who had many friends online, expressed their clear preference for their offline friends and for Greek-Cypriot friends, as well as pointing out that their friends online were mostly people they also knew or had met anyhow in real life: *“I would say I have deeper friendly feelings for my real life friends, as we go out together, we meet socially, there is more trust in them, as we meet face to face.” “I don’t have many friends online. My friends are around me, in real life. They are mostly Cypriots and they are from the university. I have also met*

*some who came from Texas, America in the Erasmus programme and we talked about how they live there.” “I don’t make friends on Face-book whom I do not know. Even the international ones are people I met first in real life.”*

All the above is consistent with existing research evidence on the interfacing of online/offline friends and contacts in that online and offline interactions interface in such a way that Facebook users search for people who are already part of their social life more than browse for strangers to expand their social experience (Lampe et al. 2006).

Regarding the use of MSN and whether the interviewees knew all the people on MSN: *“Yes. Whether I met them recently or knew them before, I know them all and they are all Greek Cypriots”*. An interviewee who doesn’t use Facebook at all said she is not inter- ested in the site: *“I have friends and I talk with them and I see them.” “I have 13 friends who are on Facebook and I know each one of them well and I see them offline. You can ignore people online easily, but not so offline. I don’t trust people easily”*. The Turkish-Cypriot interviewee said: *“I have never tried to meet Greek-Cypriot s online.... I have never asked my Greek friends if they are on Facebook and they have never asked me.”* One of the exchange students commented: *“Most of my friends are Europeans, North Americans and Arabs. No, I don’t have many Cypriot friends. They don’t seem to want to interact much. I sometimes feel that they are a bit stuck up. I also don’t care to have a lot of friends on my friends’ list to show off.”* Several interviewees (a minority of 4-5) stated as having online friends they haven’t met in real life, non Greek-Cypriots as well, including Americans, Europeans, Canadians, Chinese, and Spanish.

## **10. RELATIONSHIPS WITH TURKISH-CYPRIOTS**

Perhaps the most striking sequence of the group’s answers because of its homogeneity was the sequence about Otherness, and more especially, the Turkish-Cypriot “Others”,and about feelings of ethnicity or nationalism, the situation of division in Cyprus being what it is. All Greek-Cypriot interviewees -25-admitted to thinking about “Them” and “Us” re the Turkish Cypriots and themselves and some did not hesitate to elaborate with different statements:

– *“Yes. Yes. Maybe it is wrong, but often enough. Especially after the opening of the barricades to northern Cyprus (in 2004) they (Turkish Cypriots) come over and take our jobs.” “Yes, I do find myself thinking about “Me and the Others” – the Turkish Cypriots. In my party (political), there are people who are extremists and I am not anyhow, one of them. I haven’t gone to the occupied areas however and do not intend to go. Yes, I feel to a great extent that my identity is territorial. It is connected to the part of Cyprus in which I live.”*

– *“Yes, I have two Turkish-Cypriots on Facebook, but I have never met any Turkish Cypriots in real life...I have some prejudice against them, one might say,*

*from what I hear from my parents...Yes, I do find myself thinking in terms of “We” and the “Other” Turkish Cypriots and I can say I feel racist enough. I believe we are superior to the Turkish Cypriots, we have more justice.”*

*– “Yes, I met 2 or 3 Turkish Cypriots online, but not in real life and even though I believe in co-existence with Turkish-Cypriots, I have never visited the occupied part of Cyprus.”*

*– “I have not met any Turkish-Cypriots online and no, I am not interested in doing it, as I don’t think we have anything to say and I am not interested in making an effort to meet them. If I happen to meet somebody and he turns out to be a good person, I could change the image I have in my mind about him. Some of them have problems with us but it doesn’t mean that they are all like that.”*

*– “To a certain extent we can live with them, but yes I do think of “Us” and “Them” and I haven’t visited the occupied areas. I don’t want to show my ID or passport to enter my own country. I believe my identity is pan-cyprian, but you go to the barricades with your ID card as a Cypriot citizen coming from the whole country and you are turned into a Cypriot visitor of the occupied areas, where there are occupying armies.”*

*– “I don’t feel strongly about other cultures in Cyprus, but there are many things separating us from the Turkish Cypriots. To co-exist with them, would be very difficult. Only if the factor of religion becomes less powerful. Language too, but mostly religion. Can you imagine Christmas time, having to answer a 3-year-old child, why you have a Xmas tree while his little Turkish Cypriot friend doesn’t have one? This is very crucial in our lives, I believe.”*

*– “No, I don’t want to present my passport, I don’t recognize them.”*

*– Here is an excerpt with very strong views on Otherness that resonates the views of the majority if not of all the interviewees.*

Do you know any Turkish Cypriots? Yes,

I know a girl. What do you think of her? Her views are more similar to ours, than the view of a Turkish girl. (Presupposes that the views of a Turkish girl are radically negative).

Do you believe that we can co-exist with the Turkish Cypriots? Yes, on a general level.

I personally however, believe that it would be difficult, as we, as a generation, are very close to the recent events in Cyprus and we are emotionally charged. Maybe later generations who will not remember or be told about the events as we are. Have you visited the occupied areas? No. I refuse to present my passport for control not by my government, in my own country.

I consider it illogical, even though I have roots in the occupied areas, as my parents come from Famagusta. Have your parents visited Famagusta? Yes, they have.

To see their house. What was their experience? My father was offered coffee by the Turkish Cypriot now occupying his house.

But this doesn't change things. He has taken over his house. For me it's different. I don't want to visit Kyrenia, Famagusta, Morphou, as I never lived in them before.

I don't know them. That is why, yes I don't identify with them and I feel my identity is territorial. It is restricted to this piece of Cyprus where I live.

Do you find yourself thinking in terms of "Us" and "Them" as to Turkish Cypriots? Yes, and I believe all Greek Cypriots do it.

It is natural. Also as to other cultures living in Cyprus? Yes. I am a racist. Can you explain that? Yes. I don't believe that we as Greeks are superior to other cultures, but there are too many people from other cultures living today in Cyprus. It is turning into a colony.

For such a small place to have so many – about one third of its population – coming from other countries and cultures, this poses a threat. That some day, we will become a minority and all the others a majority.

Do you ever catch yourself thinking of "Us" Greek Cypriots and "Them", Turkish Cypriots? Yes.

Do you also think that of other nationalities in Cyprus, like Armenians, Maronites, Asians, Arabs? Not so much.

Why specifically then the Turkish Cypriots? It is our history, the way we have been brought up.

Young people like me, are not, we are not to be blamed for what happened.

But things must change before feelings change. I must feel and they must feel that we are family.

Right now I don't feel that. I feel a Greek Cypriot and look on them as Turkish Cypriots. Do you believe the unsolved Cyprus problem is very much responsible for this? Yes, I believe so, very much.

I don't know any other Turkish Cypriots aside from the three I have mentioned. Yes, I do discriminate between "them" and "us". Yes I do believe we can co-exist.

As to other cultures like Asians, Pakistanis, Russians in Cyprus, them, I consider as complete strangers. With Turkish Cypriots we have more in common. Yes, I think in those terms.

I believe it is because of the Turkish invasion and all the stories that happened then about which we hear from our parents. As to the exchange students, it is

interesting to observe that they also thought in terms of “Us” and “Them”, saying that they had been influenced by the Greek-Cypriot students and society and that the backwardness of the other side reinforces this negative thinking.

## CONCLUSIONS

Buying through the Internet, although present, did not seem to be a very strong trend. Contrariwise, there were strong reservations as regards the quality, the standard, if not the price of the ordered goods. So lifestyle habits of buying from shops or through the traditional media ads seemed to prevail as yet among the sample.

Job-seeking and professional pursuits on the net and especially through Facebook did not, either seem to be a main point of interest with the interviewed sample, who seemed to be very focused as to what they were looking for and where, as regards the pursuit of employment or the furthering of their professional engagement. The way they spoke about jobs traced through Facebook – modeling and serving coffee – also insinuated a hidden doubt about job seeking on Facebook, or on the Internet generally.

Participation in either the Causes on Facebook or other similar serious group activities, on Facebook or in civic activities in actual life again seemed to be limited. The sample seemed to be involved rather superficially in occasional philanthropic gestures, like contributing money to collections, or signing for some kind of protest, but very few were consistently involved in groups that tried to tackle, as campaigners, either local or global problems.

As to political participation, even though there was a rather strong response to voting, actual involvement in politics was very limited, and a lack of trust in political parties and institutions, all created in Cyprus during its last 50 years of independence, reminds one of Castell’s (2004) statement that: “*When new political institutions are created, or recreated, they are defensive trenches of identity, rather than launching platforms of political sovereignty.*” This reality, according to the author (ibid:34) leads to the creation of a cultural nationalism, whereby: “... *the cultural nationalist regards the nation as a product of its unique history and culture, and as a collective solidarity endowed with unique attributes. In short, cultural nationalism is concerned with the distinctiveness of the cultural community as the essence of a nation*”.

Perhaps this cultural nationalism surfaced eventually in the 27 interviews of this project, as it became clear that inspite of the internet experience and the substantial use of a transborder platform like Facebook, the identity of this age group seems to be bound up with the life world in the territories of the Cyprus Republic, not the whole of the island, which, besides they never experienced themselves.

To remind ourselves of Manuel Castells (2004, p.57) “*ethnicity is being specified as a source of meaning and identity, to be melted not with other ethnicities, but under broader principles of cultural self-definition, such as religion, nation and gender*”. The historical context or even the “*territorial historicity*” in which people develop and progress plays a very important role in shaping their collective memory.

Even in the cases where the interviewees have met Turkish-Cypriots on Facebook, their acceptance of them in real life is very meager, reminding us of Smith’s comment (in Mackay and Sullivan, eds. 1999, p.96) that: “*The depth and weight of national cultures, symbols and ideas of national cultures, cannot measure up to those which purport to be global*”..but the latter ...tend to lack history and depth and are not anchored or shared in everyday life and experience.”

In the case of Cyprus, of course we cannot describe the localized ethnicity of Greek-Cypriotness, as a phenomenon of “*defensive trenches of identity*” a reaction against “*global elites*” which Castells (2004, p. 34) marks in other countries, but it could be a reaction against the immediate threat of the invasion and the continuing occupation, which has become a cumulative experience in the collective consciousness of the Greek-Cypriots, thus affecting on a group level their social representations. It can, in other words be an ethnic nationalism that is “*defensive and reactive, but not proactive, functioning as a refuge and solidarity to protect against a hostile outside world*” (Ibid, p.68) (in Cyprus a neighbouring, threatening world).

This defensiveness came through very strongly when Identity and Otherness were explored, as the interviewees felt strongly this divisional differentiation between them and the Turkish-Cypriots, the entire set of feelings being framed against the backdrop of a territorial identity that decries division and occupation as illegal and threatening factors. This is where identity politics in the corporeal world (in Cyprus) take leave of expected or anticipated (globalized) identity politics on the Internet and in particular among, perhaps, Facebook users. The local identity supercedes any extension of the self over time and space, with reactions, responses, feelings and attitudes being generated by the local geographical and political realities on the island, harsh and unchanging for the last 37 years.

The conclusions from this project are one more addition to similar conclusions by other research projects about the identity of young people in Cyprus conducted during the last 10 years or so.

In 1997, in a research report on “Television and the Cultural Identity of Cyprus Youth” (Roussou, 2001, p.132 ) the self-stated identity of young Greek-Cypriots 13-18, showed “48% feeling Greek-Cypriots and 18.8% Cypriots.” In 2006, 43% of youth surveyed (48% of Greek-Cypriots and 39% Turkish-Cypriots identified themselves as “Cypriots” (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009 XIV), however, “a closer examination of the term “Cypriot” revealed that a striking 86% of Greek-Cypriots and a corresponding 55% of Turkish-Cypriots, when using the term “Cyp-

riot” refer exclusively to Greek-Cypriots or Turkish-Cypriots respectively (i.e. to their own ethnic community and not to all Cypriots.”

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in our introduction, the present researchers in their paper on youth and new communication technologies (2008) came to some very relevant conclusions, which are being repeated in the present paper. Namely that “*In spite of Europeanization and globalization, the celebration of the end of nationalism, as mentioned earlier, seems to be premature*” (p. 264). And: “*One of the most worrisome aspects though in the results of this survey which deserves further research is young people’s avoidance to contribute to the public sphere in real life, as very few seemed to be active in any specific social, political, or cultural areas*” (p. 264).


Perhaps Castells is right in coming to the following conclusion about contemporary identities. Identities which, in the context of internet communication, adopt virtual fish pets and engage in virtual restaurants, but on an intensive scale respond defensively to the situation prevailing in Cyprus with its individual local geo-political particularities: “*Local communities, constructed through collective action and preserved through collective memory, are specific sources of identities. But these identities, in most cases are defensive reactions against the impositions of global disorder and uncontrollable, fast-paced change. They do build havens, but not heavens*” (2004, p. 68).

Conclusively it is true that, as mentioned in the introduction of this research paper the Internet has provided a new way of creating communities that extend beyond geographic boundaries (Kraut et al., 2002), and can be a new venue for youth to engage in civic and volunteering activities across local communities and national frontiers. Young people can learn through it about political life and experience the challenges and rewards of democratic participation (Camino and Zeldin, 2002). Nevertheless, there is perhaps reason in what writers like Hafez (2007, p. 117) maintain that “*the Internet is an important but overestimated medium, always in relation to real, life world local and geo-political factors.*”

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## **Foreign Policy and the Greek Media: the ‘Daily National Issue’**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Greek foreign policy affairs are codified within and outside the media as “national issues”. Previous work on the subject, as well as our extensive bibliographical and empirical research (in television and the press) shows that although interna-*

*tional affairs are covered to a limited extent on the Greek news, this is not the case for the so-called “national issues”. Since the mid-1970s, and in particular after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, these not only prevail catalytically in the coverage of international/external affairs, but also supply the “daily national issue”. This phenomenon may be defined as the condition whereby the tension, frequency and hierarchical position of one “national issue” is reduced, either for political or communicative reasons, and replaced by a different one, which not only enjoys an advantageous and predominant position in the content and coverage of international news, but also operates as a conduit of nationalist ideology. At the end of the naughties, however, the ‘daily national issue’, and the degree of its manifestation in the news, appears to be larger in private television and smaller in newspapers and public television. Understanding, therefore, the phenomenon and the intensity of the “daily national issue” in the Greek media, requires an examination not only of the Greek nationalist discourse and its manifestations in the coverage of foreign policy, but also of the factors related with the characteristics and categories of the media.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Greek media and foreign policy, media and ‘national issues’, media and nationalism.*

## INTRODUCTION

Greek foreign policy is characterized by an intense anxiety of in-security (Tsoukalis, 1997, pp. 280-281). Political and public discourse is dominated by the emphasis not on „national interests” or “issues of national interest” but on “just” and “deservingly national issues” - in particular with reference to Cyprus, Turkey<sup>1</sup> and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)<sup>2</sup> - (Heraclides, 2001, p. 74). The nationalist perspective of the political system facilitates the reproduction and reinforcement of an ethnocentric discourse, sustaining a representation of Greece as a nation under “threat” from the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the USA, and its neighboring countries (Turkey, FYROM). In addition, the media play a significant role not only by “manufacturing consent”, legitimizing the claims and nationalist positions of the Greek governments, but also by contributing to the construction of an aggressive and inflexible position (Frango-

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<sup>1</sup> This is attributed to Greece’s „memory” of traumatic experiences resulting from a long, and in some cases painful, process of nation building (Asia Minor 1922), as well as from the constant, as far as the perception of external “threat” is concerned, display of Turkey’s revisionist stance in the Aegean (from the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, onwards).

<sup>2</sup> The development of bilateral relations between Greece and FYROM began with the signing of the Interim Agreement on 13th September 1995. The issue of the country’s name, however, remains unresolved. The Greek side calls for the adoption of a definitive composite name with geographical qualification of the term Macedonia, for all purposes and for all uses.

nikolopoulos, 2007, 2010). As the Anan Plan for Cyprus in 2004 indicates<sup>3</sup>, the media reflect and feed public opinion, perpetuating and reinforcing the tension by putting considerable pressure on the government to react “tough”<sup>4</sup> (Panagiotou, 2006).

Thus, with the aim of analyzing the content and significance attributed by the media to the so-called “national issues” towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, we undertook, together with the Laboratory of Social Research on the Mass Media (University of Athens, Department of Communication and Media), a research project entitled “International Relations and Foreign Policy in Greek television and Press.” Our research spanned from September 1st 2007 to April 30th 2008, during which time we collected and analyzed 729 television news and 1.803 articles on external, foreign policy and international issues. Television news were selected from six national broadcasters, four from the private sector (Mega, Alpha, Alter and ANT1) and two from the public sector (ET3, NET). Newspaper articles were collected from national presses covering the entire political spectrum. These were: To Vima, Rizospastis, Kathimerini, Eleutheros Tipos, Ethnos and Augi. Our research method was content analysis combined with discourse analysis, conducted on the basis of two protocols, one for television and one for the press. The television protocol included 213 variables, whereas that of the press 207. The data were entered into SPSS and then analysed. Concisely, these variables dealt with the following:

- the general and specific thematic content of the news stories/articles,
- the countries and organizations (regional and international) involved,
- their source (internal, external) and national origin,
- the “talking heads” that commented on and discussed issues of international relations and foreign policy, as well as their political and institutional identity,
- the position of the journalists, the politicians and other actors on the presentation and discussion of the news (i.e. what they thought and how they portrayed the news),
- the verbal-figural pattern of the news stories/articles.

Bearing that in mind, and for the analysis that will follow, we would like to note that during our research, besides the official visit of former Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis to Turkey (January 2008), the first such visit of a Greek Prime Minister since 1959, the foreign policy issue<sup>5</sup> which dominated the public debate and the news was the „name” of FYROM, and in particular: (a) the negotiations of the UN’s mediator with the representatives of Greece and FYROM, (b) the proposals of the UN’s mediator on the „name” issue, and (c) the NATO Summit in Bucharest (April

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<sup>3</sup> The plan dealt with the reunification and coexistence of the two Cypriot communities within the same state entity in the form of a functional and viable bi-zonal, bi-communal confederation. The plan was subjected to two separate referenda, and was rejected by 75.83% of the Greek Cypriots.

<sup>4</sup> Certainly the Greek media are not solely responsible (Dogan Tilic, 2000; Ozunes and Terzis, 2000)

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2008), where, and in accordance with the Greek position, it was unanimously decided that FYROM not only complies with the principle of good neighborly relations, but also reaches an agreement on the “name” issue as a necessary prerequisite for accession to NATO. In Greece, this development was greeted as a success<sup>6</sup> as it was argued that it allows for the adoption of a definitive composite name with geographical qualification of the term Macedonia, for all purposes and for all uses, so as to avoid confusion with the Greek Macedonia.

## 1. WHAT IS THE “DAILY NATIONAL ISSUE”?

As it emerges from our research, international affairs are covered to a limited extent on the Greek news. However, this is not the case for the so-called “national issues”. This certainly is not a Greek phenomenon, yet, in Greece, it acquires significant dimensions as “*national issues*” not only prevail catalytically in the coverage of international and external affairs, but also supply the “*daily national issue*”.

The “*daily national issue*” reflects a particular characteristic of the media in Greece when covering issues of international and external affairs. Generally, the phenomenon can be understood as the elevation of one foreign policy matter—defined as a “*national issue*”—to the highest position of coverage, exposure and publicity in the news. In particular, the phenomenon is associated, firstly, with the preponderance of one “national issue” among external news or the totality of news; secondly, with the replacement of one foreign policy matter by another that is also defined as a “national issue”.

During the 1970s, the “national issue” that dominated the Greek media was Cyprus, while in the 1980s it was Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations that drew media attention. Media coverage, particularly press coverage, occurred mainly within the context of political nationalism as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In addition, and given the absence of electronic media in the private sector, Greek public broadcasting reiterated official governmental policy and “*rallied behind the flag*” (Mitropoulos, 2003, pp. 283-285). During the early 1990s, following the declaration of independence of FYROM under the name “Republic of Macedonia”, the “Macedonian issue” acquired a central position among the “national issues” in the Greek media (Armenakis et al., 1996; Panagiotopoulou, 1996; Demertzis and Armenakis, 1998; Skoulariki, 2007). In the late nineties, and following the official inauguration of diplomatic relations between Greece and FYROM in 1995, the “Macedonian issue” lost the primacy it enjoyed in the national news (Demertzis et al., 1999). The dominant “national issue” was Greek-Turkish relations especially after the Imia Crisis of 1996<sup>7</sup> which brought the two countries at the brink of war

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<sup>7</sup> It started off on 25th December 1995, when a Turkish cargo boat ran around the Imia islet. The Turkish captain refused assistance from the Greek authorities claiming that he was within Turkish territorial

(Panagiotou, 2005). The introduction of private electronic media in the 1990s, operating within a fully commercialized communication system in the naughties (Mitropoulos, 2003, pp. 291-292), further accentuated the phenomenon of the “*daily national issue*”. An analysis of 1.879 news items in eight commercial and public television broadcasters towards the end of 2004 (Pleios et al., 2005), and given the negotiations of Turkey with the EU on the so-called Accession Framework document, showed that almost two thirds of the total foreign news were devoted to Greek-Turkish relations, one fifth to the “Macedonian issue” and less than one tenth to the “Cypriot issue”.

## 2. CULTURE, NATIONALISM AND THE ‘DAILY NATIONAL ISSUE’

The ‘daily national issue’, we could argue, is a phenomenon associated with countries of the “periphery” which do not play a protagonist role in international relations, and are also characterized by a strong presence of tradition in politics and society. Theoretical analysis and empirical research has shown that there is a significant difference in the issues that the media of the “centre” cover, in comparison with the media that operate in the “semi-periphery” and “periphery”. In “big” countries international developments and especially those considered to be very significant for the international system, occupy the first or one of the leading positions in the media (Wu, 2004; Soroka, 2003; Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1984; Cohen, 1963). In “small” countries that play a secondary role in the international system, the content of the media is mainly on the multilateral and bilateral relations of their region and geographical neighborhood, the so-called “regionalization” of news (Hjarvard, 2001).

Greek foreign policy affairs and in particular those defined as “national issues”, are related to and dependent on the geopolitical position of the country, a reality that is transcribed to the media. External and foreign policy news concentrate primarily on the neighborhood of the country, as well as on the relations with the EU (Pleios, 2009). This contributes to the introversion and “domestication” of the news (Clausen, 2004), particularly in Greek television. According to Papatanasopoulos (1997, pp. 279-293) in 1985 the percentage of international news covered by Greece’s state-owned television ET1 was 23,7% to increase only to 33.4% by 1996. In 1993, in one of Greece’s influential private television stations Mega, the percentage of interna-

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waters. On December 29 a verbal note was sent to the Greek embassy in Ankara by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and for a while the two sides were engaged in a silent dispute regarding the status of the islet. However, the diplomatic activities of the two countries were aired by the Greek commercial TV station ANT1 on January 24th 1996. The newspaper Hurriyet arrived on the island with a team of journalists and photographers, asking the mayor to remove the Greek flag and hoist the Turkish one. Hurriyet published a front page editorial depicting the Turkish journalists removing the Greek flag on the very next day, to which the Greek media replied. By January 31, the Greek and Turkish Naval forces stood opposite to each other in the Aegean, a group of Turkish people landed on the islet opposite Imia and a Greek helicopter had crashed into the sea costing the life of one pilot.

tional news was 18,5% (and 15,5% in 1996). Indicative are also the results of our research. In the Greek media (television and newspapers) almost two thirds of the news are devoted to internal issues and one third to external news (international and Greek foreign policy), with the vast amount of the external news devoted to Greek foreign policy “non-national” and “national issues”, (70,3% for television and 61,6% for the newspapers). Inevitably, therefore, the smaller the number for external and international news, the larger will be the amount for Greek foreign policy, especially “national issues”, thus also supplying and enhancing the “daily national issue”.

Furthermore, in societies like the Greek one, which are characterized by the strong presence of tradition, especially in the area of political culture, the dominant form of nationalism is that of cultural nationalism and the romantic perception of the nation (Demertzis, 1996, pp.236-244). This was particularly evident during the 1990s, as the events associated with FYROM, bilaterally and multilaterally (EU, NATO and UN), cultivated perceptions associated with the prism of “Greek Exceptionalism”. At the core of this ideological position is the “*culture of the underdog*”, basic traits of which are introversion, xenophobia, siege mentality, and a prevalence for conspiracy- related approaches and interpretations of international developments (Ioakeimidis, 2007). Such discourses mold the Greek population to believe that although they are “superior”, history has been playing tricks with them and they have been permanently betrayed by “foreign allies”.

Cultural nationalism, thus, has a permanent presence in the understanding and coverage of foreign policy. It is linked with the idea of the nation per se, forming the framework within which foreign policy is placed and negotiated. This nationalist ideology does not share the vertical character of political ideology, like liberalism or socialism, but is line with a perception according to which national identity is not only above but also excludes all other ideologies. Nationalism, therefore, operates horizontally, penetrating all political ideologies (Smith, 1991, pp. 143-178; Demertzis, 1996, pp. 56-83, 143-145). Thus, there are no “national issues” but issues in foreign policy that promote and project the nationalist prism. These issues not only alternate on the political and media agenda, but also contribute to the phenomenon of the “*daily national issue*”.

Foreign policy issues, therefore, do not have to be posed in order to instigate a nationalist approach. The nationalist ideology and discourse preexists, contributing not only to the definition of foreign policy issues as “national issues”, but also to their elevation and preponderance among the external, international or any other kind of news. Thus, the degree to which the tension, frequency and hierarchical position of one “national issue” is reduced, either for political or communicative reasons, and then replaced by another one, not only it enjoys an advantageous and dominant position in the media, but also operates as a conduit of nationalist ideology.

Culture and ideology set the notional context within which foreign policy is perceived by the media (Wanda et al., 2004; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen, 2004; Ström-

bäck, 2008; Shanahn and Morgan, 1999, pp. 233-237). The media project foreign policy and the events related to it within an ideological perception and cultural framework (Hall, 1980; Gamson et al., 1992). Galasińska and Galasiński (2003) stress that in international relations the language or term used for reference to other states is not neutral but ideologically burdened. Fowler (1991) argues that media language shapes ideas and perceptions. Thus, the use of the term “national issues” as opposed to “foreign policy issues”, refers to a hostile or conflictual relationship with countries that “threaten” with different means and degrees the identity, territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the Greek nation-state. Suffering from introversion, the media not only reinforce the reactionary defensiveness and victimization mentality of the Greek public, but also its ambiguity towards European and international affairs. The consequences are severe for both the construction of the context in which foreign policy issues are discussed, as well for the content of the public discourse in foreign policy issues. Indeed, the first is under pressure from what is on the media agenda, while the latter creates a fear to pursue and accept negotiated and conciliatory solutions to long-standing problems with Greece’s neighbors.

Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, and with specific reference to the crisis of 1987<sup>8</sup>, Giallourides (2000, pp. 281-312) and Panagiotou (2005, pp. 112-189) have shown that the Greek papers created emotions of insecurity and threat with emphasis on Turkey’s “neo-ottoman” and “provocative” foreign policy. The crisis was analysed only in line with the Greek position and Turkey was constructed as a diachronic “danger”, with no respect for international law (Panagiotou, 2005, pp. 196). Such coverage fostered the feeling of “injustice” and “betrayal” of Greece, (Panagiotou, 2005, pp. 197-119) and presented Greek-Turkish relations as an issue that concerns the “survival” and “honor” of the nation. The media rather than reducing the dynamic of the conflict strengthened it (Giallourides, 2001, pp.271), creating as a result an offensive and non-negotiable nationalist position (Panagiotou, 2005, p.191).

On the “Macedonian issue” during the 1990s, research has shown that the papers, in their overwhelming majority, adopted ethnocentric views. The issue was covered with an introvert and nationalist approach, with 55% of the articles pivoting mainly on matters of national identity, tradition and history (Armenakis et al., 1993; Panagiotopoulou, 1996). FYROM was perceived as a “threat” to the territorial integrity of Greece and the national identity of the “Greek Macedonians”. The “Macedonian issue” was projected as the recycled conflict of Greece as a historical and ti-

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<sup>8</sup> t all began in March 1987, when the Greek government tabled a bill to take control of the Canadian North Aegean Petroleum Company that exploited the Prinos oilfield off the Greek island of Thasos. Turkey accused Greece of having violated the Bern Protocol of 1976 and as a result granted exploration and exploitation licenses to the state owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation in international waters near the Greek island of Samothrace. On 28 March the Turkish survey ship “Sismik” under military naval escort set sail for Aegean Sea and the Greek and Turkish ships were placed under alert. In the end the threat of hostilities were averted when Turkish Prime Minister Ozal declared that “Sismik” would operate only in Turkish territorial waters, while Greece likewise declared that no drilling would take place in disputed waters.

meless entity within a threatening regional environment, a reality that called for a “*united national front*” and an emphasis on national identity over all other political or social identities (Skoulariki. 2007).

During the Kosovo crisis of 1999 the main topical concerns that dominated the Greek media coverage did not differ from the foci in other international media (media stories/analyses around the issues of military operations and refugees). The framing of the news and the interpretations of the developments, however, were different. As a result of the Orthodox confession, shared with the Serbs, media reports were much more concentrated on the Serbs ordeals than on the suffering of the Croats and Bosnian-Muslims. Prior to the Kosovo crisis the media had also created “moral panics” in news items regarding the formation of the “Islamic arch” to the north and east of Greece. In addition, reports on the “Islamization” of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were also frequent. ANT1, a private television station, presented the refusal of the religious leader of the Bosnian Muslims to meet with the Serb Patriarch in Sarajevo as an act of intransigence. The Greek Public Broadcast Corporation (ET1) associated the Bosnian government with Saudi Arabia. It featured reports of Bosnian Muslims, including the republic’s president, traveling for the annual hadj to Mecca, emphasizing that all their expenses were paid by Saudi Arabia. During the Kosovo crisis the media did not discuss the massacres committed by the Serbs. No mention was made of the fact that Belgrade controlled and manipulated the flow of information. All those actors who stood against Milosevic, the opposition, the intellectuals, the students and the workers unions, were not worthy of consideration by the Greek media. Instead, the Greek media chose to represent and act in the name of all those diverse elements of Greek society (right-wing parties, left-wing parties, religious and cultural groups), which took the form of a united front, an “Unholy Alliance” against the invasive and imperialistic forces behind the NATO bombings. Given the country’s experiences (junta 1967-1974, Cyprus 1974) the readers and audiences in Greece may have felt “comfortable” with reports against the USA and NATO. The question, however, was not only NATO. In Europe and other parts of the world many were the journalists, newspapers and television stations that disagreed with the bombings. In so doing, however, they did not disregard the massacres committed by the Serbs. The Greek position facilitated the construction of a national identity dissociated from the European values of pluralism and freedom (Kondopoulou, 2002; Tsagarousianou, 1999; Michas, 2002; Tiropoli, 2003).

Characteristic is also the position of the media during the crisis of Imia. A dominant characteristic of this crisis in the press was the understanding of foreign policy as part of internal policy (Alexopoulos, 1999; Panagiotou, 2005, p.294). In particular, the Greek political system was criticized for not having developed a “national” strategy, as opposed to Turkey’s long-term, consistent and “barbarian” foreign policy (Panagiotou, 2005, pp. 296). Indeed, Greek artists, intellectuals, academics, politicians and former officers of the Greek armed forces, were asked to express their opinion on televised and live shows. A famous actor went so far as to donate her jewelry

to the Greek Navy! It is also reported that a journalist requested the leadership of the Greek Navy not to undertake any operations during night time, as that would not allow his station to have clear pictures of the hostilities in the Aegean! (Prenderis, 1999, p. 97).

The decision of Greece in 1999 to support Turkey's candidacy for accession to EU, as shall be noted below, has 'dumped' some characteristics of this approach, especially in the press (Panagiotou, 2005, pp. 407-496). This "change", however, does not mean that the Greek media have been infiltrated with the logic of the peaceful settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes. They follow than lead the political leadership of the country, supporting the position of the government that the involvement of the EU in the relations of the two countries will end up justifying Greece. In fact, as the study of Panagiotou (2006) shows on the Anan Plan in 2004, the Greek press developed a bipartisan and united front that insisted on a dynamic and offensive policy towards Turkey. Such coverage not only influenced the reaction of public opinion, with 65% to 70% upholding a negative position, but also reproduced the "tough" and non-negotiable nationalistic approach that characterized the events of 1987 and 1996.

According to the results of our research, it was the "Macedonian issue" which occupied a position of supremacy in TV news in 2007-2008, with 80,10% of the total foreign news, followed by Greek-Turkish relations (14,80%) and the "Cypriot issue" (5,10%). Significant are also our findings in the ratio of Greek foreign policy news and other international issues. Specifically, in television over two thirds of the news (70,30%) concentrated on Greek foreign policy, followed by only 29,70% on international politics. This not only contributed to the high level of coverage the "daily national issue" enjoyed, but also instigated and exacerbated media attention to "national issues" at large. While towards the end of 2004, "national issues" occupied middle positions on the agenda of television news bulletins (Pleios et al., 2005) in 2007-2008 they became increasingly important as a result of the negotiations on FYROM's name.

Regarding the newspapers, however, the results of our research indicate that the amount of articles devoted to "non-national issues" (63, 20%) was nearly double the amount of those for "national issues" (36,80%), as compared to 35,50% and 64,50% for television. It emerges, therefore, that the nationalist intensity was smaller in the coverage of the papers. In addition, it is also evident that Greek-Turkish relations and the "Cypriot issue" not only received more coverage in the newspapers, but that the "Macedonian issue" also received a relatively smaller coverage in relation to television news, facilitating therefore the reduction of the nationalist intensity in the coverage of Greek foreign policy and the "daily national issue". Specifically, our research on newspaper coverage shows that 63% of the total foreign news was devoted to the "Macedonian issue", 23.2% to Greek-Turkish relations and 13.8% to the "Cypriot issue". As in the news of Greek television, however, there appears to be a relation between the amount of news devoted to "national issues" and the amount of

news for Greek foreign policy. Thus, in the total amount of articles for international news, the percentage of articles for Greek foreign policy (61,20%) was greater than that for international affairs (38,40%), but smaller than the corresponding one for television news.

It is clear, therefore, that the foreign policy coverage of the presses examined was and is not only influenced by current events. Theoretical analysis and empirical research has shown that it is also influenced by factors related to the operation of the media, such as economics and ownership status (Maning, 2007, pp.143-151; Hermann and Chomsky, 1988), and the interplay between the logic of politics and the logic of the medium (Eldridge, 1995; Bennett, 1999, pp. 221-260; Thussu, 2003; Schechter 2003; Meyer and Hinchman, 2008, pp:141-146; Tunchman, 1973; Tunstall, 1971, 1993). Understanding the phenomenon of the “daily national issue”, thus, also requires not only an examination of the ethnocentric discourse and its manifestations in the coverage of foreign policy, but also of the characteristics and category of the medium.

### **3. CHARACTERISTICS AND CATEGORY OF THE MEDIUM AND THE ‘DAILY NATIONAL ISSUE’**

The media coverage and content of foreign policy is not only the result of the prevailing nationalistic discourse, but also of the political inclination, the “internal” or “external pluralism” that characterizes the medium (Hallin & Manchini 2004). In newspapers the logic of politics is expected to be present to a greater extent than the logic of nationalism. Usually, political nationalism is more in line (not absolutely but comparatively) with the characteristics of newspapers, as they maintain a specific political and ideological orientation. On the contrary, it appears that the cultural nationalistic and ethnocentric discourse is more acute in the electronic media, especially television, as it is directed to the wider public, avoiding a clear political and ideological stance.

Bearing that in mind, and for the purpose of our remaining analysis, we can distinguish four basic ways of media coverage when dealing with foreign policy affairs as “national issues”:

- coverage in which the ideological and nationalist prepossession is direct and intense, as with the use of the term “national issues”;
- coverage where the nationalist prepossession is indirect, expressed in the form of mild repudiation, the so-called “disclaimer” phenomenon (Van Dijk, 1998), with the use of terms that hide the “national” but codify foreign policy issues into “Macedonian”, “Aegean” and “Cypriot”;
- coverage which tries to alleviate nationalist prepossessions with the use of neutral terms and enunciations (e.g. “international” “European” or “Balkan issue”, “international law” or “regional” or “multilateral issue”);

– coverage that is in line with the logic of diplomatic correctness, where foreign policy issues are treated as “bilateral” (e.g. “Greek-Turkish relations” or “Greece’s relations with FYROM”).

According to the results of our research in 2007-2008, the media and in particular newspaper news, appeared to be in line with the foreign policy position of the government and the political system. The media accepted the political logic and strategy of the government, especially on relations with Turkey and FYROM. On Turkey, that was not politically current during the period of our research, the nationalist prepossession appeared to be smaller. On FYROM, which happened to be politically current during the period of our research, the ethnocentric-nationalist prepossession was more intense, indicating that the nationalist discourse of the media was preserved by focusing on a current and „national issue” of foreign policy.

Specifically, the majority of television news appeared to conceal the dominant ethnocentric approach with the use of indirect and mild references. This, as noted above, is the phenomenon of mild “disclaimers” in the news. Although it contributes to the mitigation of the intensity and manifestation of the ethnocentric prism, at the same time it is also a way of articulating the nationalistic perception with the use of other terms (Goodhardt et al., 1987; Galasińska and Galasiński, 2003, p. 852). Thus, and although the use of eager ethnocentric terms in television news, such as “national issues”, was low, at the same time low was also the use of neutral and diplomatically correct terms, especially on the “Macedonian issue”. Whereas the term “national issue” was used only in 34 stories, the term “Macedonia issue” was used in 153 stories. Reference to FYROM as an international or European issue was only made in 42 stories.

In the papers, on the other hand, there appeared to be a significant reduction in the ethnocentric perception of foreign policy. The percentage of the articles that were characterized by a neutral and diplomatic correct position was 54% for the “Macedonian issue”, 61,70% for Greek-Turkish relations and 51,70% for the “Cypriot issue”. The neutral references, especially on Greek-Turkish relations, indicate the strong influence of political logic as opposed to cultural nationalism. The newspapers, as they are characterized more by political logic, seem to have adapted to a greater extent to the changing positions of the political system on foreign policy. This data confirms the results of previous research on the subject (Lazarou, 2009), according to which the Greek newspapers gradually have begun to adopt a more “mild” line, supporting and mediating the efforts of Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The newspapers, thus, appear to be playing an important role in facilitating a more neutral and multifaceted examination of Greek foreign policy<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Greece’s and Turkey’s governments are convinced that Greek-Turkish rapprochement on issues of soft policy and Turkey’s adaption to the community acquis as she moves towards Europe will contribute to improving bilateral relations. Greek-Turkish cooperation is developing and aims at consolidating a climate of confidence and collaboration in a considerable number of areas of mutual interest, such as

In addition, an important factor of the media when presenting foreign policy is the morphology of their content, their verbal structure (Bennett, 1999, pp.105-148). A special position in the verbal construction occupies the logic of infotainment and dramatization. Dramatization and the norms of entertainment, associated with the commercial logic of the media (Fairclough, 1994), penetrate the coverage of all foreign policy matters. This not only allows for the frequent alternation of the advantageous position a “national issue” enjoys among foreign and international news, but may also contribute to a condition whereby all “national issues” are of equal significance. This tendency is likely to be greater in television, and especially in private television, where the strategy of dramatization is more intense (Papathanasopoulos, 2001).

According to our research in 2007-2008, public television seems to attribute less attention to “national issues”. Private/commercial television devotes greater attention to “national issues”. Greek public television are penetrated to a greater extent with political logic, whereas private/commercial television more by the logic of the medium. In particular, the private and public state-owned television stations appeared to devote the same importance and more or less the same amount of news to FYROM (120 stories in private TV and 114 in public TV), as compared to the relations with Turkey and the “Cypriot issue” (28 for Turkey and 2 for Cyprus in private TV, 15 for Turkey and 13 for Cyprus in public TV). It should, however, be noted that the number of news they represented (120 and 114) is drawn from four private and two public television stations. Thus, in public television the coverage of Greece’s relations with FYROM was much greater, almost double, in comparison to private television. This can be explained not only as the result of the greater influence political logic exercises in the news of public television, but also because of the support public television traditionally displays to the policy of the government. For the same reasons, the attention of the public television is significantly greater than that of private television on the “Cyprus issue”, although it was of low “commercial” value during the period of our research.

Regarding the newspapers, our research data also indicates that papers that carry a more infotainment logic (Eleutheros Tipos, Ethos) had a greater number of articles on the “Cypriot issue” (37 articles) and Greek-Turkish relations (70 articles) in contrast to “serious” newspapers (To Vima, Kathimerini, Rizospastis and Augi), with 22 articles on the “Cypriot issue” and 24 on Greek-Turkish relations. These differences should be explained as the result of the inclination of “serious” papers to rally behind the policy of the government and to embrace a “soft” diplomatic approach towards the resolution of Greece’s disputes with her neighbors (Lazarou 2009). On the other hand, the greater presence of Greek-Turkish relations in Eleutheros Tipos and Ethnos

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cultural relations, tourism, environment, combating crime, economic and trade relations, energy, agriculture. A large number of high-level meetings have recently taken place between Greek and Turkish officials, in the hope that the broadening and deepening of bilateral cooperation, as well as the frank exchange of views will create the conditions for overcoming the frictions of many decades.

is not only the result of their greater infotainment inclination, but also of the fact that they appear to adopt the positions of Greek cultural nationalism, at the core of which for a long time have been the turbulent relations of Greece with Turkey (Panagiotou, 2005, pp. 497-517, Kourkoulas, 1998, Pappas, 1999).

## CONCLUSION

The position of Greece in the “periphery” of the international system encourages the media to concentrate primarily on the bilateral relationships of the country with neighboring countries. This not only contributes to the introversion of the news, but as indicated in the data of our and previous research, also allows for the dominant presence of the so-called “national issues” in the content of the media, especially television. The introversion of Greek news, as well as the use of the term “national issues”, however, is also owned to the intense presence of the nationalist ideology in the understanding of Greece’s foreign policy. This contributes to the phenomenon of the “daily national issue”, the preponderance of one or more “national issues” in the public debate and the coverage of the media according to political and diplomatic developments.

At the same time, despite the prominence of the so-called “national issues”, there also appears to be a gradual reduction of the nationalist intensity, a steady shift from cultural to political nationalism. This shift is connected not only with political logic, but also with the rallying of the media, and in particular the press and public television, behind the positions of the political leadership on foreign policy in the naughtiest. Although this is a gradual and subtle transformation, following than leading government policy change, it could facilitate the conditions whereby the media may operate as a mediating factor in the realization of a public discourse which downplays the “daily national issue” and reduces the nationalist intensity from which it originates. This is important considering Greece’s, current unprecedented financial crisis, which has caused high unemployment rates and instability, reigniting social and political conflicts, violent protests and riots, adding a volatile dimension to the countries’ economic downturn. Increasing insecurity and deterioration of living conditions facilitate the hardening of identity and framing of the “enemy”. As identities harden, differences become more pronounced, and all sides fall back on stereotypes and the stigmatization of the adversary through language or actions intended to dehumanize, thereby, justifying hostile actions against the “Other”; the asylum seeker, the refugee the immigrant, the supporters of other ideologies, the political extremists but also the “Other” European nations. In fact, the crisis has triggered intra-European tensions, Europhobia, the propagation of negative stereotypes and the rebirth of Europe’s North-South divide. This reality not only affects Greece’s relationship with third countries, mainly with regard to the immigration influx, particularly in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and Asia, but also in relation with traditional conflicts (e.g. Greece-Turkey, Greece-FYROM).


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## **Media Coverage in Minor Proceeding: in the Light of Krone Case of ECHR**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*Freedom of expression is defined as one of the main pillars of any democratic society. Transitional countries as well as true democracies are faced with the problem of complying with international standards governing the exercise of this right,*

*especially when it collides with the other rights of equal significance, such as the right to privacy. This issue is further compounded when it involves a vulnerable group of the population - minors, when they are processed within the criminal justice system. Juvenile delinquency is considered a serious legal and social problem facing not only children, teachers, or parents, but also the professional media. Members of the press and media are expected to carefully and accurately report on juvenile delinquency, bearing in mind their role and importance in the creation and presentation of views on this important issue not only to lay public, but sometimes the experts, and even the judges. To enable adequate treatment of this sensitive issue involving the conflict of two important rights - the freedom of expression and the right to privacy - and after careful analysis of the European legal framework, this paper aims to present the reasoning and logic behind the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights dealing with this question (Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG and Krone Multimedia GmbH & Co KG v. Austria case, No. 33497/07 dated on 17.01.2012).*

**KEYWORDS:** *Freedom of expression, right to privacy, media coverage, juvenile justice*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The rights of media and freedom of the press are paramount concerns, not only in the transitioning countries, but also in democratic countries (Vodinelic, 2010, p. 71). The exact scope, boundaries, and limitations on these rights are not delineated due to the undeveloped legal climate and inexperience of civil courts and society with implementing such rights. Even more pressing are situations where the rights of media and the press conflict with internationally established legal rights of individuals, as in the case of minors. In juvenile proceedings, therefore, there is a clash between the rights of the juvenile to confidentiality and protection of his best interests and the right of the media to access of information. When the rights of two interest groups such as the press and the juvenile offender come into conflict, the courts and the legal community are tasked with providing a framework for resolution. However, in countries that have only recently recognized the right of free press and free speech, there is the problem that these rights will be practiced in excess or even abused to the detriment of other conflicting rights such as the individual right to privacy.

The analysis of the most recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights, Krone case in the abovementioned scenario, requires analysis of the legal framework for media access to juvenile proceedings, current international standards, laws, and recommendations.

## 1. EUROPEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

### 2.1 Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress, as precisely stipulated under the most authoritative legal text in that area, Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. However, of equal significance is the right of privacy, stated under Article 8 of the Convention, the implementation of which often assumes legal collision with freedom of press. This potential collision has been debated from the perspective of the freedom of the press, including media coverage, and the juvenile's right to privacy. The European Court of Human Rights, analyzing all national available legal instruments, decided in the Krone case in favor of the juvenile's right to privacy, holding that the public policy reason was not present for the eventual disclosure of the identity of the juvenile.

The European Court of Human Rights analyzed media access to juvenile justice within the context of compulsory legal texts such as the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, Charter of the fundamental rights of European Union and several relevant recommendations such as No. Rec (85)11 and No. Rec (87) 20.<sup>1</sup>

The European Convention (Article 10) stipulates that *“everyone has the right to freedom of expression, this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.”*

Every right, including freedom of expression, may be limited but in the manner and under circumstances prescribed by law. Article 10 paragraph 2 of the European Convention explicitly provides that freedom of expression *“since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”*

### 1.2 Right of Privacy of a Child

One of the cornerstones of a democratic society is the right to information and the public's right to receive information of public interest. This right should be under-

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<sup>1</sup> Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, as amended by Protocol No. 11 and No. 14.

stood as the ability to do anything that does not harm others, and thus it means that the limits of the right to information are conditioned by other's rights. None of the guaranteed rights can ever be absolutely enjoyed without limitations. On the contrary, as general postulate in law, the right can be exercised up to the infringement of other internationally recognized rights. However, one must not unreasonably restrict freedom of the expression, either through misuse by the public or by private authority.

The media often violate people's privacy by referring to unilateral interpretation of the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, it is necessary to find a way to balance these two fundamental rights, both guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to respect for one's private life and the right to freedom of expression. Therefore, a proceeding that involves a child such as juvenile proceedings, has to absolutely adhere to the principle of the confidentiality. This has been determined as the vital interest in ensuring fair trial without intimidation and victimization of the child.

On one hand, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights calls for respect for private and family life, providing that: *“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”*<sup>2</sup>

Furthermore, children's access to justice at national and international level became one of the pillars of the Council of Europe Strategy on the Rights of the Child 2009-2011<sup>3</sup> and Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice and their explanatory memorandum<sup>4</sup>. The Beijing Rules, as

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<sup>2</sup> The entire text of the Convention see at: <http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice and their explanatory memorandum (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010 at the 1098th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) Guidelines and Explanatory memorandum - version edited 31 May 2011. [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/childjustice/Guidelines%20on%20child-friendly%20justice%20and%20their%20explanatory%20memorandum%20\\_4\\_.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/childjustice/Guidelines%20on%20child-friendly%20justice%20and%20their%20explanatory%20memorandum%20_4_.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> Guidelines, p. 6:

“2. Protection of private and family life

6. The privacy and personal data of children who are or have been involved in judicial or non-judicial proceedings and other interventions should be protected in accordance with national law. This generally implies that no information or personal data may be made available or published, particularly in the media, which could reveal or indirectly enable the disclosure of the child's identity, including image, detailed descriptions of the child or the child's family, names or addresses, audio and video records, etc.

7. Member states should prevent violations of the privacy rights as mentioned under guideline

not binding rules in international law, were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985. Article 8, paragraph 1 on the Protection of Privacy of these Rules stipulates that: “(t)he juvenile’s privacy shall be respected at all stages in order to avoid harm being caused to her or him by undue publicity or by the process of labeling. Furthermore, in the paragraph 2 of the same article states that, “(i)n principle, no information that may lead to the identification of a juvenile offender shall be published”. Furthermore, with respect to the disposition of the competent authorities in article 17 of the same text, it is stipulated that “the reaction taken shall always be in proportion not only to the circumstances and gravity of the offense but also to the circumstances and the needs of the child as well as to the needs of the society...The well-being of the juvenile shall be the guiding factor in the consideration of her or his case.”

The United Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child 1989<sup>5</sup>, the binding force under international law, under Article 3(i) states that “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Article 40 of the same Convention provides that “State Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child’s respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.” The next line of the same paragraph provides that, “the States Parties shall, in particular,

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6. Above by the media through legislative measures or monitoring self-regulation by the media.

8. Member states should stipulate limited access to all records or documents containing personal and sensitive data of children, in particular in proceedings involving them. If the transfer of personal and sensitive data is necessary, while taking into account the best interests of the child, member states should regulate this transfer in line with relevant data protection legislation.

9. Whenever children are being heard or giving evidence in judicial or non-judicial proceedings or other interventions, where appropriate, this should preferably take place in camera. As a rule, only those directly involved should be present, provided that they do not obstruct children in giving evidence.

10. Professionals working with and for children should abide by the strict rules of confidentiality, except where there is a risk of harm to the child. 3. Safety (special preventive measures)

11. In all judicial and non-judicial proceedings or other interventions, children should be protected from harm, including intimidation, reprisals and secondary victimization.

12. Professionals working with and for children should, where necessary, be subject to regular vetting, according to national law and without prejudice to the independence of the judiciary, to ensure their suitability to work with children.

13. Special precautionary measures should apply to children when the alleged perpetrator is a parent, a member of the family or a primary caregiver.”

<sup>5</sup> The United Nations Convention On The Rights Of The Child 1989 was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989

ensure that '(e)very child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has ...his or her priva-cy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.'

Furthermore, it stipulates that "States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions, specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: (b) whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for the dealing with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights are fully respected...."

In a similar manner to article 6 of the European Convention, Article 14(4) International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) stipulates that: "In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age, and the desira- bility of promoting their rehabilitation." Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, Article 31 reads as follows: "(1) Each party shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, inclu- ding their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and criminal proceedings, in particular by:... (e) protecting their privacy, their identity and their image and by taking measures in accordance with international law to prevent the public dissemination of any information that could lead to their identification"<sup>6</sup>.

In the Explanatory Report to the Con- vention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, paragraph 222 gives the following comment on Article 31 of that Convention: "The article goes on to list a number of procedural rules designed to implement the general principles set out in Article 31: The possibility for victims of being heard, of supplying evidence, of having their privacy, particularly their identity and image protected, and of being protected against any risk of retaliation and repeat victimization. The negotiators wished to stress that the protection of the victim's identity, image and privacy extends to the risk of 'public' disclosure, and that these requirements should not prevent this information being revealed in the context of the actual proceedings, in order to respect the principles that both parties must be heard and the inherent rights of the defence during a criminal prosecution."

It also seems relevant to mention one of the most relevant legal texts, without the compulsory effects, Recommendation Rec (85)11<sup>7</sup> dealing with "the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure." In section F (Protection of privacy) point 15 reads as follows: "Information and public relations policy in connection with the investigation and trial of offences should give due consideration to the need to protect the victim from any publicity which will unduly affect his priva-

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<sup>6</sup> Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (General measures of protection) of 25 October 2007, CETS No. 201.

<sup>7</sup> This Recommendation No. Rec (85) 11 has been adopted by Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 28 June 1985.

*te life and dignity. If the type of offence or the particular status or personal situation and safety of the victim make such a special protection necessary, either the trial before the judgment should be held in camera or disclosure or publication of personal information should be restricted to whatever extent is appropriate.”*

Recommendations No. Rec (87) 20<sup>8</sup> stipulates “*that social reactions to juvenile delinquency should take account of the personality and specific needs of minors, and that the latter need specialized interventions and, where appropriate, specialized treatment, based in particular on the principles embodied in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Furthermore, having regard to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“the Beijing Rules”), it recommends the governments of member states to review, if necessary, their legislation and practice with a view: ... 4) to ensuring that minors are tried more rapidly, avoiding undue delay, so as to ensure effective educational action; ... 8) to reinforcing the legal position of minors throughout the proceedings by recognizing inter alia: ... the right of juveniles to respect for their private lives...”*

Recommendation Rec(2001)16 on the protection of children against sexual exploitation<sup>9</sup>, under Article III point 32 stipulates that judicial, mediation or administrative proceedings should enjoy the confidentiality of records and respect for the privacy of children who have been victims of sexual exploitation.

In addition to it, the appendix to the Recommendation Rec (2003)13<sup>10</sup> on the provision of information, through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, contains the following principle 8 on the Protection of privacy in the context of ongoing criminal proceedings: The provision of information about suspects, accused or convicted persons or other parties to criminal proceedings should respect their right to protection of privacy in accordance with.

Article 8 of the Convention. „*Particular protection should be given to parties who are minors or other vulnerable persons, as well as to victims, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, accused and convicted. In all cases, particular consideration should be given to the harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling their identification may have on the persons referred to in this Principle. An even stronger protection is recommended to parties who are minors, to victims of criminal offences, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, the accused and convicted persons...”*

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<sup>8</sup> Recommendations No. Rec (87) 20 has been adopted on September 17, 1987 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

<sup>9</sup> Recommendation Rec(2001)16 has been adopted on 31 October 2001 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

<sup>10</sup> Recommendation Rec(2003)13 has been adopted on 10 July 2003 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

## 2. THE ANALYSIS OF THE COURT FINDINGS

To provide a legal framework within the European legal community that reconciles the clash between these two rights, the authors provide an analysis of the ratio legis of the decision which in January had become the part of the EUHR case law, *Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG and Krone Multimedia GmbH & Co KG v. Austria* case (hereinafter referred to as *Krone case*).

In the *Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG and Krone Multimedia GmbH & Co KG v. Austria* case (Application No.33497/07, dated on 17 January 2012, Strasbourg), A and B were suspected of the repeated and serious illtreatment and sexual abuse of C, causing the latter severe injuries. The biological mother of C, D cooperated with the newspaper by providing it with the picture of C in 2003, when she was three and was later sporadically being given the custody to C.

The applicants - the daily newspaper *Kronen Zeitung* and the owner of the online newspaper *www.krone.at* complained before the European Court of Human Rights on the final decision of the national court of Austria. The Regional Criminal Court in Austria (Landesgericht für Strafsachen), on the ground that the newspaper *Kronen Zeitung* and *www.krone.at* in the articles appeared on 16, and 22 February 2005 had caused suffering of C by violating her private life and publishing the photos of her, revealing C's first name, the full names and pictures of biological father A and step mother B, granted C compensation (4,000 EUR in compensation to C for each of the articles) finding that "*the identity of the victim of a criminal offence could only be revealed if there was a predominant public interest in that specific item of information*". It also found that C was entitled to compensation from the second applicant company as the articles published on its website on 16 and 22 February 2005. The Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

The applicants complained before the EHCJ on the ground that interference had been "necessary in a democratic society" in the light of the Article 10 of the Convention.

In fact, the applicant called upon the violation of the Article 10 (2) of the Convention stating that "*dissemination of the information is the part of democratic process particularly when there is the overriding public interest in reporting in every detail on the case in issue, and when reporting in view of the very nature of the criminal offence – violence and sexual abuse within the family*". They argued that press shall report in an identifying manner on crimes of sexual abuse of minors within the family revealing the identity of the offender, as accurate and detailed reporting also served to protect and help the victims of such crimes. They stated that reporting with revealing the identity of the offenders was in accordance with the Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant companies further argued that in any event they had been allowed to report on the case in the manner they did in the articles at issue as they had been authorized to do so by D, the biological mother of

C, in 2003. That authorization logically extended to the publication of the articles on the trial against A and B.

Under Article 10 of the European Convention and Article 31 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, which obliges the Contracting States “*to take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, by protecting their identity and by taking measures in accordance with international law to prevent the public dissemination of any information that could lead to their identification*“. The same concept of protecting the identity of victims of crime has also been recognized in various recommendations adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (see Recommendations Rec(85)11, Rec(2001)16 and Rec(2003)13.

The Court, invoking prior case law, applied the test of necessity that required examination of whether the interference of media was a result of “pressing social need” and determining to what degree the media should be allowed to fulfill its basic function of being “*public watchdog*” quoting the *Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom* (no. 1), 26 April 1979. The Court proceeded to explain that the question before them required the balancing of two competing interests: disclosure of the identity of a victim of a criminal offence as against the media’s freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, including the media’s right to inform the public on matters of public concern regarding ongoing criminal proceedings. The Court held that the applicant companies, by reporting in the described manner, breached C’s right to remain anonymous intruded into the strictly private life of C, a minor. They determined that there was no prevailing public interest that necessitated the media’s disclosure of her identity. The Court also found that the applicant companies could have informed the public in a sufficiently detailed manner without revealing the identity of the accused and thereby that also of the victim, as this particular information had not been essential for understanding the case of C or served any other specific purpose such as warning and protecting the public. The Court concluded that at the time of the publication at issue no valid consent to the applicant companies’ publications had existed as in 2005 D had explicitly revoked her consent given in 2003.

Therefore, the ECHR that there has accordingly been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. On contrary, the Court granted the requests and ordered both applicant companies to pay compensation.

## **CONCLUSION**

From the perspective of clash that occurred within the context of these two guaranteed crucial freedoms, accordingly there are at least two crucial legal issues that are to be explained through the corners of the international legislative mandatory and not obligatory texts: 1) freedom of expression as the pillar of any democratic so-

ciety and the 2) right to privacy, defined under legal instruments as the limiting factor on the scope and definition of the freedom of expression (Smet, 2010, p. 190). When seen and analyzed through the lenses of the most susceptible, social vulnerable group – minors – the conflict between these two rights must be more strictly scrutinized. National laws, usually, make it unclear whether the media has unregulated or restricted access to these proceedings. The legal issues surrounding media coverage of, and access to, juvenile proceedings involve whether the media would be willing to accept certain conditions on their ability to publish information in particular juvenile cases in exchange for access to these proceedings<sup>11</sup>.


In the most recent Krone case brought before the European Court of Human Rights, the Court attempted to establish a future pattern for media access to juvenile proceedings within a broader legal framework that will result in a more standard and uniform application across European nations. Furthermore, this case increases current knowledge of the legal standards and framework for media coverage of juvenile offenders, as the part of the higher education of journalists, dealing and reporting on the juvenile proceedings, judges who are expected to be familiar with the international standards and the practice of European Court of Human Rights. The analysis in this article aims to increase awareness of the boundaries of media role in treating juveniles, and to improve consistency in media access to juvenile proceedings by taking into consideration the findings of the cases before European Court of Human Right.

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, five cases brought before the ECHR (within this legal issue) has shown that there is the consistent practice, although scant.



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## Some Beliefs About Press Freedom

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### ABSTRACT

*This article intends to rectify three popular beliefs related to press freedom: that the idea of a free marketplace of ideas with a self-righting truth belongs to original liberalism, that UNESCO's primary mission is to promote freedom of information, and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides legal safeguards for the media. These beliefs are shown, on the basis of the legacy of liberalism and documents of the international community, to be misleading myths. The Millennium Declaration provides further proof that the international community has a much more balanced view of freedom of information than that typically held by media professionals.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Freedom of information, liberalism, press freedom, international law.*

## INTRODUCTION

Freedom is one of the most pervasive elements of modern thought – both the popular consciousness and expert conceptualization of the human being, society and the world at large. Together with other fundamental tenets such as development and democracy, freedom is part and parcel of the big story of history called “modernity”. The end of the 20th century was a turning point not only in the formal calendar introducing a new millennium but also because of the “Collapse of Communism”, which followed the end of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, leaving behind the division of the world into capitalist West, socialist East and the mixed South – China, Cuba and North Korea remaining pockets of socialism amid the mass of global capitalism. The challenge of deconstructing such a central element in our thinking – both everyday and academic – is naturally enormous and cannot be but touched upon in one article. Here we focus on press freedom – not freedom of speech at large – and we do so by singling out three well-known cases which highlight the misconceptions about freedom when applied to the media.

The first case takes us back to the classics of liberal thought, particularly to John Milton’s *Areopagitica* of 1644 and to John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty* of 1859. Neither of them proves to be the source of the doctrine whereby there must be a free marketplace of ideas which itself ensures that truth will prevail. This doctrine was shaped only in the 20th century USA, first in legal and political debates between the two World Wars and finally during the Cold War in the 1950s. Hence it is a myth to take the concept of a free marketplace of ideas as part and parcel of original liberalism<sup>1</sup>. The two other cases relate to landmark documents of the international community which are typically misused to uphold a biased western view of press freedom: UNESCO’s Constitution of 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Moreover, we highlight the Millennium Declaration of 2000. All these documents introduce an idea of media freedom which is quite nuanced and far from the absolutist notion conventionally advocated especially by commercial media proprietors – namely that freedom in this field means absence of State control, including legal regulation other than safeguards against censorship. International law does not support this notion of negative freedom; what is suggested instead is a notion of positive freedom whereby freedom is not an end product to be protected as such but a means to ensure other more general objectives such as peace and democracy. This article aims to make a point with selected cases and does not intend to

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<sup>1</sup> This case is based on a doctoral dissertation on John Stuart Mill and his relation to the libertarian theory of the press just completed by Jorma Mäntylä at the University of Tampere. It is published in Finnish; a summarizing article in English is in preparation.

give a comprehensive presentation of the big issues involved. It is deliberately one-sided and may appear provocative to those believing in the myths in question.

## **1. FREE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND THE LEGACY OF LIBERALISM**

Fred Siebert summarizes his essay on the libertarian theory in *Four Theories of the Press* as follows: The libertarian theory of the function of the mass media in a democratic society has had a long and arduous history. This history has paralleled the development of democratic principles in government and free enterprise in economics. The theory itself can trace a respected lineage among the philosophers of ancient times, but it received its greatest impetus from the developments in Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From Milton to Holmes it has stressed the superiority of the principle of individual freedom and judgment and the axiom that truth when allowed free rein will emerge victorious from any encounter. Its slogans have been the “*self-righting process*” and the “*free market place of ideas*.” It has been an integral part of the great march of democracy which has resulted in the stupendous advancement of the well-being of humanity. It has been the guiding principle of western civilization for more than two hundred years. (Siebert et al., 1956, p. 70).

This text, more than anything else, has fuelled the myth that the idea of a free marketplace of ideas with its mechanism of self-righting truth belongs to the core of liberalism, based on Milton and Mill. The *Four Theories* became a baseline for thinking about the media systems in the world as it filled a gap in textbooks on journalism and mass communication.

In point of fact, the doctrine of a free marketplace of ideas with a self-righting truth cannot be found in the works of Milton and Mill. Neither of these classics of liberalism introduced the concept of marketplace of ideas, although both did advocate freedom of thought and speech without prior censorship. The following two sentences from Milton’s pamphlet *Areopagitica* are usually quoted as proof that he is the father of the concept of self-correcting truth: And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? (Altschull, 1990, p. 40).

Actually Milton does not claim here that truth will automatically prevail; his point is to oppose the licensing and censorship of printing. He insisted that all kinds of views should be allowed to be brought to the public and allowed to clash without hindrance. In his main work *Paradise Lost* of 1667, Milton elaborated the struggle between truth and falsehood and made a fervent appeal to challenge official truths,

including God's commandments, with an invitation even to commit sins as a means to acquire knowledge and to achieve human growth and development. In short, Milton cannot be taken as an early advocate of market liberalism: "*Call him radical, call him puritan, call him republican, but do not call him (neo)liberal.*" (Peters, 2005, p. 72).

John Stuart Mill, who had minutely scrutinized what Milton had written two centuries earlier, shared the position about the free encounter of ideas and the inadmissibility of censorship. His *On Liberty* is a fine elaboration of the same theme but it does not include anything about markets, let alone about a free marketplace of ideas. The rest of Mill's production is likewise void in this respect. For a liberal he was far from dogmatic about the role of the State, considering that state intervention may well be necessary in ensuring social justice and other higher values. Also, freedom of opinion and its expression was not for Mill an end in itself; he viewed it as "*the necessity for the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends)*", as he expressed the ultimate objective in his summary of the grounds for pursuing this freedom.

As to the concept of self-righting truth, Mill actually held a contrary view, whereby it was quite possible that truth failed to prevail in a free encounter and falsehood became a dominant public opinion. In *On Liberty* he dismissed the concept of self-righting truth as a "*pleasant falsehood*". Later Mill had a bitter personal experience of how falsehood may prevail: with his wife, Harriet Taylor-Mill, he fought for women's emancipation but failed to gain broader support and even became an object of ridicule, finally losing his seat in Parliament.

Consequently, it is a myth that the standard justification for press freedom based on the doctrine of free marketplace of ideas comes from the classics of liberalism. Milton and Mill do not provide direct support for contemporary neo-liberalism and cannot be taken as the basis for a libertarian theory of the press. The legacy of original liberalism represents rather social democracy and corresponds to a social responsibility theory of the press proposed by the Hutchins Commission in the USA in 1947. The concept of freedom in the original liberal philosophy was positive rather than negative: freedom for something, not freedom from something.

Peters (2004) traces the first uses of the phrase "*free marketplace of ideas*" to the pages of *The New York Times* in the routine political discourse of the 1930s, but a more profound occurrence before the 1948 Congressional election campaign comes from an unusual quarter: the Communist Party of the USA, which wanted to campaign "*in a free marketplace of ideas*". Obviously American leftists employed the slogan as a defense against rising anticommunism. However, Peters (2004, pp. 72-9) shows that the context of the Cold War soon turned around the political sponsorship of the slogan and that already in 1953 *The New York Times* used it as an argument against the Eastern European countries which had censorship to prevent the emergence of a free marketplace of ideas. It was in this intellectual and political

climate that the doctrine became ingrained in the libertarian theory of the Four Theories of the Press. Accordingly, it is correct to say, as suggested by Nerone (1995), that this theoretical construct is built on an ideological Cold War foundation and that it has little in common with the legacy of original liberalism.

## 2. UNESCO AND THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

UNESCO presents itself typically as a defender of freedom – not the least press freedom. The Communication and Information Sector (CI) was established in its present form in 1990. Its programs are rooted in UNESCO's Constitution, which requires the Organization to promote "*free flow of ideas by word and image*"...Let us read carefully what UNESCO's Constitution says about the promotion of "*free flow of information by word and image*":

- The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

- To realize this purpose the Organization will: "*Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image*".

The conceptual structure of the constitutional stipulation is quite clear, with the mandate to promote free flow placed on the third level below (1) peace and security and (2) mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples. The reference to human rights and fundamental freedoms in Article 1 does not provide an unconditional license for free flow but rather ties UNESCO's mandate to the general principles of international law as laid down in the UN Charter. In fact, here we have a textbook example of the notion of positive freedom – free flow serving other objectives (freedom for) instead of being an end in itself as the notion of negative freedom is understood (freedom from).

By adopting freedom as a leading theme especially in the media field, UNESCO draws a line at the world before 1990 – with its division into three worlds, including the socialist bloc of the East and the Non-Aligned Movement of the South. Entering a new millennium, UNESCO presents itself as freed from the burdens of the past. Psychologically this may be understandable as treatment of a trauma, but it is fatally wrong in terms of UNESCO's constitutional status and role in international politics. By wrapping IC sector in a freedom banner, UNESCO has dissociated itself from its basic mandate and supported the myth that its mission is unconditional free flow.

In order to understand what has happened at UNESCO, one needs to recall the history of the anti-imperialist drive of the 1970s (Nordenstreng, 1999, p. 32). It was part and parcel of a more fundamental development in the global arena with landmarks such as the UN resolutions on a New International Economic Order and equating Zionism with racism. During this radical period in international politics, UNESCO made history by producing the Mass Media Declaration, the MacBride Report and setting up the International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC). It is remarkable that all this was done by diplomatic consensus, although the “*great media debate*” in the 1970s went through three war-like stages of (1) decolonization offensive, (2) western counterattack, and (3) truce (Ibid, p. 45).

At the height of the NWICO battles in the 1980s, the coalition dominated by U.S. press proprietors and led by the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) engineered “*The Declaration of Talloires*,” which advocated the U.S. First Amendment notion of media freedom and attacked the NWICO for ostensibly advocating State control of the media. This call by the self-proclaimed voice of the “*independent news media*” was endorsed by a letter from President Ronald Reagan, the highest representative of the U.S. State (Ibid, p. 257). The Talloires group went around proudly quoting the letter, without seeing the paradox: the State actively advocating a denial of State involvement in the media.

In a still broader historical context, UNESCO’s current approach to the free flow of information means a return to what Americans had been trying to push onto its agenda since its foundation in 1945 and which largely figured in its communication policies in the 1950s and 1960s – regardless of what the Constitution said. As Herbert Schiller (1976) has shown, the American doctrine of free flow of information has an ironic prehistory between the two World Wars when the Associated Press (AP) used it as an argument in encroaching upon the territories of the British and French news agencies Reuters and Havas (Cooper, 1992).

The lesson from this history is, firstly, that free flow of information has never been a neutral and ecumenical concept but rather a tactical argument in socio-economic and ideological struggles. Secondly, the constitutional mission of UNESCO, based on a text drafted in the idealistic spirit towards the end of World War II, was contradictory to the free flow doctrine created in the USA and turned into a Cold War instrument. Thirdly, by following the free flow doctrine, UNESCO deviated from its constitutional mission until the 1970s when the Mass Media Declaration, the MacBride Commission and NWICO brought it back on track. As we know, this turn back to basics was only short-lived and was derailed by political shifts in the world.

In any case we may say with just a little exaggeration that in the media field UNESCO has never been closer to its constitutional mission than during the 1970s. After all, the concept of NWICO is more compatible with UNESCO’s Constitution than is the free flow doctrine.

### 3. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

While the preceding two cases took us on lengthy historical excursions, the present one is fairly simple and straightforward: the subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms is not an institution called the press or the media but an individual human being. Therefore the phrase “*freedom of the press*” is misleading as it includes an elusive idea that the privilege of human rights is extended to the media, its owners and managers, rather than to the people for expressing their voice through the media.

Let us read carefully the famous Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “*Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers*”.

Nothing in Article 19 suggests that the institution of the press has any ownership right to this freedom. And the word “media” appears as an open means for the use of “everyone” to seek, receive and impart information and ideas. In fact, this article stipulates that the media should be in the service, if not the ownership, of the people. It is a myth that the press and the media themselves enjoy protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Accordingly, the legal form of what is referred to as “press freedom” includes a concept of freedom which is far from the unconditional license to do anything, as is typically suggested by media proprietors and also many journalists. As in the preceding two cases, the concept of freedom under human rights turns out to be quite qualified and leads us to be wary of the conventional myth. Because of everything what we said, here is a challenge for journalism educators to prepare an easy - to - read and up - to - date presentation of the true idea of freedom within the context of international law and politics<sup>2</sup>.

### 4. MEDIA FREEDOM AND THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION

Here finally we have an authoritative document of the international community – although only a Declaration, not a text of proper international law – which speaks literally about the freedom of the media. But how? It is not an abstract freedom granted to the media but a call or even an obligation to perform a certain role in society and to assist people to gain access to information. Once more, it is a concept of positive freedom to perform a certain role – not a negative freedom from restraint to do whatever the media may want to do. The parameters for the “essential role” are

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<sup>2</sup> Of course this should have been done long ago by UNESCO. However, its activity relating to the media and journalism has systematically avoided putting on its agenda matters of principle such as freedom, and it has rather affirmatively followed the political trends of the day. A new platform also for this challenge will be provided by the first World Journalism Education Congress in Singapore in June 2007.

not specified, but the Millennium Declaration leaves little doubt about what is meant under the preceding four chapters “*Values and principles*”, “*Peace, security and disarmament*”, “*Development and poverty eradication*”, and “*Protecting our common environment*”.

Consequently, we can trace a centuries - long historical line from the early modern age to the post-modern world, with a surprisingly coherent idea of freedom of information. In this context, liberalism is not a partisan ideology hijacked by U.S. diplomacy but a balanced philosophy which is far from outdated. And despite political turns at UNESCO, the idealism written into its Constitution is far from a dead letter. Although the new millennium faces ever greater problems in the world, there is still cause for optimism.

## CONCLUSION

The myths covered in this article suggest that freedom applied to the media is a highly problematic concept. Moreover, it is a conspicuously ideological concept – especially when understood to be simple and apolitical.

While the exposure of the myths above has been somewhat polemic and one - sided, it does not suggest that the idea of freedom – in general or applied to the media – should be undermined or subjected to dogmatic doubt. On the contrary, freedom of thought, of expression and of the media is cherished as a vital element in the lives of individuals as well as societies.

Yet, the concept of freedom should not be elevated beyond critical assessment and debate, as often is done, especially by press freedom advocates, who tend to mystify the notion of freedom and stigmatize others questioning the absolutist nature of (press) freedom<sup>3</sup>.

It is precisely because of its great value that freedom should not be allowed to degenerate into an ideological instrument, as has too often been the case. The very phrase “press freedom” serves as a warning example. In order to disprove the old myths and to avoid the emergence of new ones, it is important that freedom, and the


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<sup>3</sup> The latest confrontation in this regard developed around the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed published in Denmark. An international study of this case was carried out at the University of Tampere, including 14 national reviews of the way freedom of speech was understood in professional and journalistic debates (Kunelius et al., 2007). In a Finnish debate stimulated by this study, its main researcher, Professor Kunelius, has been attacked by several journalists after he used the term “fundamentalist” to characterize an extreme libertarian view (one in a typology of four) whereby the publishing of the cartoons can under no circumstances be denied on grounds of principle. Kunelius pointed out that such a fundamentalist version of freedom places itself beyond reflection and thus turns against the idea of liberty as an open and tolerant approach. His opponents on their part accuse him and his fellow researchers of condoning censorship. Obviously the same kind of debate – or a dialogue of the deaf - takes place also elsewhere with stimuli such as the Danish cartoons.

lack of it, remain in constant debate – not only as a reality but also as an idea, in the spirit of Milton and Mill.

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## Media Self Regulation and its Challenges

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### ABSTRACT

*The Article argues, that media self-regulation is a democratic phenomenon, which requires a proper legislative media framework providing for freedom of media and freedom of expression. Media self-regulation protects the audience from unethical media reporting and safeguards professional standards. Solid professional standards make media stronger and more resilient to pressure from powerful political and/or economic interests. Media self-regulation supports also media economic interests helping them to gain the trust of the audience from one hand and avoid expensive court cases on the other hand. In the time of the economic crisis media self-regulation is challenged under the pressure for survival and the chaise for profit. This makes media much more susceptible to sensationalism and violations of the Code of ethics*

**KEYWORDS:** *Media Self -Regulation, Media Accountability, Professional Standards.*

## **1. CONDITIONS**

Media self-regulation is a democratic phenomenon. It requires organization of a state in a way, which promotes freedom of expression and freedom of media. Self-regulation in the media could be developed if there is a respective legislative media framework in place, which guarantees freedom of expression. Normally each democratic state provides for freedom of expression in its constitution and regulates this fundamental human right in a set of media laws.

However, freedom of expression is not an absolute freedom. It has its limits. As it is stipulated in the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 10 *"The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary"*.

Balancing between the right of freedom of expression and other human rights and interests, such as for instance the right to privacy, the right to presumption of innocence, the right to protection of minors, etc. requires observation of the law and establishment of Code of Ethics and respective bodies, which ensure their implementation in practice.

## **2. THE GOALS OF MEDIA SELF REGULATION**

Through establishment and adoption of Codes of Ethics the media set out their own professional standards and limits. In such a way the media self-regulation strengthens and safeguards professional standards. Media, which is professional and hold high standards gain the trust of their audience and respectively supports their own sustainability. Media self-regulation provides a mechanism for a constant analysis of media performance and compliance with professional standards, which constantly elevates the quality of media reporting. On the other hand solid professional standards make media stronger and more resilient to pressure from powerful political and/or economic interests. Thus the media self-regulation supports media freedom and independence of editorial policy and keeps away the state from interference in media through unnecessary regulation.

When media manage to regulate themselves they send a positive message to the society that they are responsible and accountable in their work. On the other hand, the media accountability mechanism helps them solve complaints against journalists in amicable way avoiding expensive court cases.

Media self-regulation protects the interests of the audience from unethical reporting and violation of human rights.

### **3. MEDIA INTERESTS IN SELF-REGULATION**

Media compete with each other to get the trust of the audience. Media self-regulation is a mechanism, which helps the achievement of this long-term goal and thus indirectly provides a strong economic incentive. If media lose the trust of the audience, it will lose this audience, and it would negatively impact the sell of their work.

Every media wants to keep a high professional image. If it breaches the Code of Ethics and the respective media self regulatory body decides that this is the case, the decision is published in all competitive media, which would gladly use the opportunity to fight their competitors.

The media in young democracies is highly protective to their rights stipulated by the Constitution and the law. Media self-regulation is a mechanism, which ensures for self-accountability of the profession to the society and keeps the state away from interference.

When complaints against media and journalists are solved amicably through the media self-regulation mechanism, the cases are not going to the Court and media outlets save money and time for expensive court procedures.

Media is well aware that if they do not regulate themselves they will be regulated by the state!

### **4. MODELS FOR MEDIA SELF REGULATION**

The research on models of media self-regulatory mechanisms throughout the world shows that there is not one universal or single model of media self-regulation.

There are many systems for media self-regulation. Media self-regulation could be organized on a national or/and on a regional level. It could be completely decentralized and each media outlet could have its own accountability mechanism. France offers an example of decentralized model for media self-regulation operating on single media level.

Media self-regulation could embrace print and electronic media or could be established only for print media. Australia, Canada and many countries throughout Europe have Press Councils for print media.

Some countries as Sweden have Media Ombudsman, which is an institution with a long tradition and credibility.

According to Prof. Claude Jean Bertrand, one of the best researchers of media accountability mechanisms in the world, the best model for media self regulation is the three party model, when the media self-regulation system includes representatives of the media industry, representatives of journalistic associations and lay members. In such way the media self-regulatory mechanism covers and protects all involved interests – the interests of those who sell the news, of those who create them, and those who consume them. Many of the media self-regulatory bodies in Europe have three partite models and include representation of the industry, lay membership, and journalists.

In some countries journalists have such strong professional organizations, which take full responsibility for the development of their profession and for elevating the professional standards, that they do not allow other representation in the self-regulatory mechanism, except journalists. Swiss is a good example.

Interesting model for media self-regulation present some countries in Caucasus and Asia, in which the Councils for media ethics include lawyers, journalists and lay membership. Having in mind the heavy dilemmas, with which the councils everywhere in the world are struggling having to decide sometimes between two equal human rights, presence of lawyers in the councils could prove to be very helpful. On the other hand, the Courts when deciding on media cases could consider the decisions taken by the councils.

## **5. CHALLENGES**

It seems that one of the biggest challenges in the time of the economic crisis is that the struggle for surviving or the chase for profit make media highly susceptible to sensations and violations of media ethics. The more the media breach the professional Code of Conduct, the more they irritate centers of economic and political powers and the more they irritate them, the more these centers bounce back and try to attack media freedom and to control them. This could perpetuate in a vicious circle, which could be broken with an effective work of a media self regulatory mechanism, which protects professional standards.

Why media self-regulation faces so many challenges nowadays? Could we talk about media ethics in one even more commercialized society? Those are questions, which turn to be difficult even in developed countries. In the time of economic crisis, when budgets are cut everywhere, the quality of professional journalism is inevitably badly influenced. Editors in chief in established democracies complain, that

facts are not checked, as they should have, and that financial restrictions negatively impact the quality of reporting. Crisis according to media gurus has especially negative impact on investigative journalism, which requires a serious research and bigger finances.

Media is an institution with its own history, development and mission. Its primary mandate is to inform and educate the society. It is highly influential. That's why it is called the fourth power. However, this is only one side of it. The other side is that the media are business establishments, which have to survive on the market as any other business and looking after profit as any other business. This is what sometimes drives them to make concessions with ethical standards and become susceptible to sensations.

These arguments are even exacerbated in the hungry, small, still developing and highly competitive media markets on the Balkans, where very often there is a lack of strong professional organizations and media faces even bigger challenges to observe ethical standards.

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
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## **Media Economics and Killing Boredom**

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## ABSTRACT

*The paper elaborates the idea that media economics is essentially based on accomplishing the economic aspects of killing boredom among the widest audience. The subject of research is the economic and management reactions of the media industry to exponential changes. The aim of the research is to explain the possibility of creating a specific media culture by forcing and imposing certain global ideological-interest matrices (e.g. neoliberal), consumerist, individualistic, and other. The paper uses general methods of social sciences. The starting point is the hypothesis that the vast majority of media are dependent, because they are essentially based on the launch and realization of their owner's interests. The main result and conclusion of the research is the indisputable fact that some dominant ideas (recipes) of the West (even if they were wrong, as is the case of economic neoliberalism) are orchestrated and propagated in the mass media, which is socially harmful.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Media industry, mass media, media psychology, media dependence, new media.*

*"People do what they are paid to do,  
and act in accordance with their own motives.  
However, from a social point of view,  
in many cases they are paid  
to do something wrong".*

Luis Garicano

## INTRODUCTION

People work so they can rest, and they rest so they can work. People use a variety of media both during work and during rest. Huge amounts of money are spent on media content and its use (information and communication technologies - ICT). In developed countries, the media industry (as a sum of several industries) participates with approximately 3% in the national income, and the rate of its economic growth has been significantly higher than the rate of total economic growth in the last three and a half decades. It seems that this is mainly related to the increase of free time, great growth of the advertising market, demographic and technological changes, strengthening of the globalization process, audiovisual communication boom, significant development of media infrastructure and convergence of information oversaturated media markets with previously isolated telecommunication markets, computers, home electronics, and software (Draskovic et al., 2017, p. 7).

The development of media industry is directly related to the development of the so-called post-industrial society (see more in: Draskovic et al., 2010; V. Draskovic,

et al., 2013) and within it the tertiary sector of the economy. In this sense, one must keep in mind the statement of D. Bell (1967; 1973) that "*the concept of post-industrial society is only an analytical construction, not a picture of a specific and concrete society... a paradigm, a social scheme, which sets new coordinates of social organization in modern Western society.*" Thereby, it is understood that post-industrial society, like any new historical period, requires a paradigmatic change in the way of thinking and behaving, which in principle comes down to adapting to civilization norms, achievements, and challenges (Draskovic, 2002, p. 11).

This manuscript explains the relationship between extremely important topics present in everyday life and work, such as media and management, especially from the aspect of the importance and role of information and management techniques. Information is a binding and common element of media and management, and management techniques are a necessary tool in the business of all media organizations. Media and management are integral parts of our everyday lives. Our lives and business activities cannot be imagined without them. Today, it seems that only imagination is their limit, which means that they practically have no limit. Nevertheless, the limits of applying management in the media are determined by the much broader social (especially political) context of media specifics.

The essence of the relationship between the four types of the modern world: media, political, economic and social, is also being phenomenologically considered. The starting point is the hypothesis that profit motivation in the first three worlds leads to crisis and poverty in the fourth world (society). Furthermore, intensive and programmed exchange of information is enabled by continuous improvement of media technologies. It is subordinated to rent-oriented values of the media, corporate, and political order. Finally, the bare economic logic of profit in the first three worlds relativizes the importance of public interests and the weak democratic and creative potential of society as a fourth world.

We also tried to consider selectively chosen motives, facts, hypotheses, specific questions, and dilemmas, which represent important inserts, but not a complete story about the media as a breaking mirror of globalization, which is often presented as an overture to the so-called „*new world order*“ (which some interpret as the sum of various forms of „*new imperialism*“). Our goal is to point out the need for a paradigmatic change in the way of thinking and behavior of media management, which in principle should be based, among other things, on adapting to civilization and development norms, achievements and challenges (instead of interest-driven motives).

## **1. MEDIA AND CHANGE**

Our modernity is characterized by many specific situations, because exponential changes have literally become a "*time and space constant*" (Collins & Devanna, 2002, p. 353). It seems that A. Einstein was right when he metaphorically said: "*Life*

*is like riding a bicycle. To keep your balance, you must keep moving.*” It can be noticed that a lot is changing in the field of cultural artifacts as well. Namely, many traditional terms are getting a media prefix: media subjects, media reality, media center, media conference, media sphere, media magazine, media dialogues, etc. However, it does not end there, because even many other modern terms add a media prefix. At the same time, these terms take on a new meaning in modern social, institutional, cultural, political, scientific, and technological (globalized) circumstances.

Obviously, there is a mutual cause-and-effect relationship between media and globalization, because the so-called „new media“ and communication contributed to the acceleration of globalization, which in turn enabled the creation of mega-media.

Media have long played a major role „in the life“ of modern society. Their role is recognized and generally acknowledged in the economic sphere, political debate, and the general cultural process, information service to citizens and the formation of value criteria of the audience. However, we have an impression that the field of media economics has been underestimated in some inexplicable way among our regional researchers. The term „mass media“ in the last two decades has increasingly referred to mass communications. The role of the press, television, radio, online sources, movies, videos, mobile phones, etc. is huge today. Therefore, modern society is not only called „informational“, but also „mediated“, because it largely depends on the media. Essentially, the foregoing testifies to the institutionalization of the notion under consideration.

## **2. MEDIA ECONOMICS**

Mass media is the subject of economic analysis for several reasons. The multi-layered media industry is a developed and highly profitable sector of the economy, having its own specific economic laws of functioning, both within the media themselves as special systems, and their relations with companies and numerous institutions from the environment. As a separate industry (or a set of various industries), mass media work not only for profit, but also to meet the special needs of the public, and different interests of numerous social groups. Due to all that, media economics (and management as its organizational and management component) is an extremely important socio-economic scientific discipline. It explores the conditions and profitability factors of the considered economy sector. In addition, its importance is emphasized by the fact that media economics analyzes the area of close and complex interactions between the „*three pillars*“ on which the prosperity of the media rests: corporate business (advertisers), state (regulator), and society (an audience that pays with their money and dedicates their free time). Finally, the media industry is chan-

ging the rhythm and dynamics of all people's lives because, among other things, it „kills boredom“<sup>1</sup> (metaphorically), at least among individuals (selectively).

The red thread of „media life“ has always been (and remains!) dual: *the production of certain values* (services, information, attitudes, ideas, performances, etc.) and the *"killing"* of people's free time (so-called „leisure“ or boredom). In order for the media to constantly maintain and develop this red thread through the continuity of the aforementioned dual relationship, it is necessary for all the above-mentioned aspects of media „life“ to function simultaneously. We have (intentionally) written this article *atypically*, in accordance with the belief that atypicality is one of the significant and general characteristics of the media industry. If for no other reason, then due to the undoubted fact that media products in economic terms operate simultaneously, not only in two markets (goods and services), but also in the third market, the so-called „network goods“.

The relationship between management (as a derived economic discipline) and the media is highly complementary, interdependent, mutually conditioned, and connected by multiple correlations. It can be viewed from various aspects. But it seems to us that one of the most important aspects is success, because it is a common target criterion. Certainly, there are no successful media without quality application of management, nor is it possible to have a successful management that does not use modern media. The primary task of media management is to overcome numerous limitations in the business environment and in the media markets by applying new knowledge, technologies, and information. It is a safe way to ensure the *quality* and *network suitability* of the media product (service), and thus the competitive advantages of the media house and the development of its key competencies.

### 3. MEDIA DEPENDENCE

There is an indisputable gap between the rhetoric of media advocacy for some civilization values and practices and the constant stifling of pluralistic institutional changes (as the basis for economic and social development), as well as numerous civilization values. We believe that any functional and well-argued critique of targeted and (often) orchestrated propaganda (and application!) of economic neoliberal-

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<sup>1</sup> This metaphorical expression of ours (syllogism) can be related to Aristotle's belief that happiness is the purpose of life. We believe that killing boredom is part of happiness. S. Freud and A. Schopenhauer also claimed that the best thing people can hope for in life is not to suffer and not to be unhappy. The multiple and multidisciplinary aspects of media are a guarantee that they can serve well for a considered purpose: economic (Picard, 1989; Greco, 1999; McChesney, 1997; Compaine & Gomery, 2000; V. Inozemtsev, 2000; Albarran, 2002; Doyle, 2002; Picard, 2002; Bartholow, et al., 2003; Bagdikian, 2004; Alexander et al., 2003; Albarran et al., 2006), *technological, institutional, and cultural* (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1972; Bozovic, 2016), *political and ideological* (Althusser, 1971; Gramsci, 1971), *information* (Balnaves et al., 2001), *communication* (Smythe, 1977; Mosco, 1996; Nazarov, 2000), *globalization* (Rutovic, 2010), *legal, artistic, apologetic*, and other aspects.

lism and neo-imperialism in the media is good. Therefore, we start with the hypothesis that, similar to bad media news, exhibition and experimental neoliberal economic elaborations in the media are extremely dysfunctional. Among other negative consequences, they cause the effect of saturation in the media audience. J. Keane (1995, p. 94) rightly noted the negative role of quasi-neoliberalism in the control of society, emphasizing that "*flirting of market liberalism with pseudo-liberalism is a key means to achieve its basic goal: to take control of the present and future, to commercialize communication media and subject them to new forms of state control, re-defining and monopolizing the prevailing collective sense of the historical past.*" Here should be added that instead of state control, control of alternative institutions was formed in most post-socialist states.

The dominant one-sided media manipulation-information model should be replaced by a two-sided equal communication model. Changing information parameters (especially interactivity, multimedia, and teamwork) as the basic categories of modern media and appropriate information content in the transition from media product to convergent content formats, can significantly contribute to the democratization and institutionalization of the media industry. In order to achieve this in practice, it is necessary to transform the media from a means of (secret or semi-public) management of mass information to a means of open mass collaborations (a term proposed by J. Habermas) with a public, generally available status.

The media are a mirror of the existing social and economic reality in which they often exist dependently (i.e. imposed by some subjects). It can be hypothetically noted that even a superficial comparative analysis shows various forms of crisis (social, economic, institutional, moral, managerial, political, ideological, scientific, educational, cultural, and other) more than proportionally negatively reflect on the media, i.e. to a complete matrix of their parametric values (freedom of expression, quality of reporting, staff training, dependence on ruling nomenclatures, apologetics, tabloids, public trust, technological equipment, profitability, etc.).

Media dependence (political, party, economic, and other) is a global and local phenomenon, which only manifests and masks differently. Economic dependence in society is predominantly reflected in media dependence. The rapid development of communication and information technologies affects it, regardless of the participation of 70% (according to *International Data Corporation* data) of the communication format, which is called content (a product created by Internet users in communication „many-to-many“). Similar to dysfunctionality of media "*bad news*", poor economic elaboration and monistic (e.g. dirigiste and/or neoliberal) exhibitions also lead to the phenomenon of audience saturation, and to obscuring the essence of economic problems, especially to obscuring the need for urgent pluralistic institutionalization (economic and social). Ignoring pluralistic institutionalization in the media and practice enables (again!) the substitution of the propagated (e.g. transitional) "kingdom of freedom" by mass phenomena of the "kingdom of necessity".

When almost nothing is produced in the gloomy and crisis social and economic reality, but mostly the so-called "deals", which at the same time bring enormous profits to the rare "builders", while the masses are at loss, then more and more various types of extreme games (money pyramids, bookmakers, reality TV shows, etc.) begin to produce, which also rare individuals win, and many people easily spend (lose) hard-earned money. The reality show can be seen as a long-lasting and developing media phenomenon of „*masked prostitution*“ (a term by R. Bozovic), in which the boundaries of many components of everyday (perhaps apparent?) reality that we know are often erased. An attempt is made to explain the essence of the reality show as an alternative media product, through the prism of e.g. sadistic spectator satisfaction, abuse of actors, identification of spectators with participants and the like, with the additional motive of entertainment („*It is a consolation to the wretched to have companions in misery*“ - Pascal) and escape from their own problems. It is not our goal to point out the well-known anti-characteristics of reality shows, in which the winner is usually the biggest anti-hero and anti-role model. We want to hypothetically state the fact that the general and long-lasting crisis (global and local, social and economic, value criteria, moral, etc.) in terms of hyper-technological possibilities, has led to commercially oriented (profit) media production, which to a greater or lesser extent represents a virtual substitute for proclaimed development, freedoms, democracy, competition, better life, etc.

Although the appearance of the so-called „new media“ occurred in the recent past, almost simultaneously and in parallel with the momentum of globalization, their dizzying development and perspectives (similar to globalization), objectively bring us to a situation that E. Toffler called „*collision with the future*“. In the modern global economy, strict and imposed laws and rules of conduct (with geo-political and geo-economic strategies) have no place for altruism and naive idyll. The general and media reality must be viewed as they are: highly interest-oriented and dependent. At the same time, the media are only one of the levers of power, which cannot function successfully without a quality application of management. Lefebvre argued that the command over space is a fundamental source of social power, and Landes supplemented his statement with the power over money and time. Without new media, these authorities are simply not possible, and thus neither social power nor the world (understood in a metaphorical and utopian sense) could be a „*global village*“ (the expression of M. McLuhan, who foreshadowed the arrival of a time of communication without prohibitions and obstacles).

The media have become increasingly interesting to study in various scientific disciplines. The rapid and strong development of the media industry at all levels of local, national, regional, and global communication has conditioned the growing importance of the business aspect of the media, primarily the profitability of media entities and their concentration. They seem to dominate over communication aspects of the media (information and communication content). This leads to neglecting the important context of preserving the informational, cultural, political, and social role of

media communication. No less important is the relationship between profitability and the social role of the media, since the opinion about becoming the so-called „*social conflict*“ between economic profitability and social responsibility of the media. The social role of the media is in a way subordinated to business (e.g. marketing lease of media space) and political aspects.

However, it should be noted that during the last global financial crisis, the media played a constructive role. They found that even private property (banks and corporations) was often covered and hidden by a cloak of special ties to the state. Without going too far into the economic essence of the problem, the media zealously announced and warned for months and years that the situation in the real estate market was overheated and that sooner or later there would be an end to rising prices and uncontrolled credit market heats with over-valued mortgages and stimulating at the cost of capital.

The media culture of the information society has developed in parallel with the new direction of the management system - media management as an important component of the management of socio-cultural activities. It is a comprehensive and complex means of human exploration of the world that surrounds it, i.e. all its aspects: social, intellectual, moral, artistic, psychological, political, economic, institutional, etc. The level of modern mass media development and the specifics of their versatile influence on the personality proves that the media are one of the factors in the practical application of the „*dialogue of cultures*“ theory. In this sense, the cultural paradigm of the modern information society should be directed at accepting the compromise of civilization conceptions, among other things, at erasing the boundaries between the „mass“ and the „elitist“. Computers and telecommunication technologies have the role (function) of instruments for balancing information, political and spiritual expansion and distribution, which creates new social values (but also myths).

Pluralistic social mass communications (as a process of information circulation) function through intermediaries (various forms of media). Through its various mechanisms, the media industry phenomenologically encompasses all areas of social life, and thus has the power of specific (symbolic - Luhmann, 2000) management of society, i.e. it has control over it. Therefore, investigative and independent journalism should strengthen. However, D. McQuail (2008, p. 54) warned that „*it can easily become obsolete*“ if it turns into an ideological diversion (as is often the case). We believe that a developed institutional environment is the most important condition for the development of independent and investigative journalism. On the other hand, it is clear that the so-called „*unprincipled coalition*“ between the media, politics, and business in institutional terms is their biggest obstacle, in addition to non-transparency (unavailability and/or privilege) of information.

## CONCLUSION


We live in a great institutional vacuum, which has created an extremely growing and illegally affirmed individualism (forced quasi-neoliberalism, etc.). The development of media industry requires not only an increase in knowledge, motivation, commitment, and will of journalists to overcome complex, crisis and often destructive institutional and business fragmentation. It is a condition for a more independent and better explanation of the essence and meaning of many modern changes, problems, and phenomena. However, for the development of media culture and media pluralism, it is necessary to overcome all dogmatic and quasi-institutional monisms (which include quasi-neoliberalism), which have a totalitarian character.

Any orientation towards narrow (anti-mass and anti-institutional) individual, political, party, ideological, and any other high-interest media indoctrination, favoritism and privilege are archaic, socially harmful, and dangerous. Cross-cultural and cross-institutional bridges are built very slowly, but they are completed sooner or later. Their ceremonial opening happens from time to time and reveals a conglomeration of social pathology, which has long and (un)skillfully hid under the programmed layers of media apologetics, professional and ideological dependence. This pathology is characterized by a high degree of unprofessionalism, tabloidization, ideologization, dogmatization, irresponsibility, imitation, improvisation, and dependence on various power centers.

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## **Differences in Communication Styles of Men and Women**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*The characteristic feature of our times is a constant change. In such a turbulent and unpredictable environment having a wide range of competences is crucial. Moreover, being able to a constant development also seems to be important. One of the main human activities is to communicate with each other. So, developing of communication competences is also to be expected. In the article, the author describes different aspects of communication, including communication competence, communication styles and online communication of men and women. Using the linguistic analysis methods, she tries to point out differences in communication styles of men and women.*

**KEY WORDS:** Communication, communication style, men, women.

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## INTRODUCTION

The changes taking place in the contemporary world are often sudden and unexpected. Especially the progressing digitization, as well as the pandemic, have accelerated the changes taking place in the reality that surrounds us. What is more, those changes affect every sphere of human life and touch its functioning on many levels.

The unexpected transfer of a large part of human activities to the virtual world has highlighted several opportunities and threats related to building relationships between people, both in the world and in Poland. In such a situation, the so-called competences of the future and their development seems to be crucial. And among them, the one that seems to be of key importance is the broadly understood communication competence. This article deals with issues related to communication competences. On the one hand, the author draws attention to various aspects of communication, with particular emphasis on online communication. On the other hand, by analysing the literature of the subject and public speeches, she tries to find an answer to the question whether there are differences in communication styles between men and women.

### 1. THE COMMUNICATION COMPETENCE

The concept of communicative competence was implemented by Hymes, who defined it as "*conscious or unconscious knowledge about the rules of using language in various situations created by a given social community*" (Grabias, 2019, p. 37). This knowledge is acquired by a person in the process of socialization, because in society an individual performs different social roles, and being in different situations, he/she uses languages in various ways, depending on these situations. Apart from using linguistic structures appropriate for a given situation, the speaker uses his / her individual cognitive and emotional features. The concept of the communication competence was deepened and developed by Grabias (Ibid.), who created the interaction model. In this model, he distinguished three types of communication determinants of statements related to who is talking to whom, in what situation and for what purpose. Those are (Ibid.):

- social conditions of speech, which are related to the performance of specific social roles, which most often form a certain hierarchical system and a specific set of linguistic means is matched to each of them,


- situational determinants of statements that are related to the situation in which the communication act takes place and are related to the speakers,
- pragmatic determinants of speech, which are related to the fact that every linguistic behaviour is carried out for a purpose, and at its root is the speaker's intention expressing his intention or desire.

Each language user engages his/her own cognitive, emotional, and social capabilities in order to choose the appropriate language structures for the intention of the statement, the situation in which it occurs and the interlocutor. The level of integration of those factors, which make up the communicative competence and the linguistic competence, determines the effectiveness of communication, which can be considered on two levels: "*pragmatic (individualistic) and - on the other hand – social*" (Bańcerowski et al., 1982, p. 38). Pragmatic (individualistic) efficiency is achieved when "*the communicative sense intended by the sender (understood as a specific unit) is exactly identical to the sense reconstructed by the recipient (also a specific individual)*" (Ibid., p. 39). In such a situation, all participants of the communication situation must have specific knowledge about the same cultural rules and conventions as well as personal non-cultural factors. As for efficiency perceived from the social point of view, it is based solely on conventionalized rules that are in force in a given culture and consists in consistency between the subjective intention of the sender and the social result of this activity caused in the recipient (ibid.).

The covid-19 pandemic has affected almost all human activities, including communication. People have been forced to isolate themselves, resulting in the development and increased use of various online communication methods. For example, according to the research conducted by Deloitte (2020), the use of a smartphone has increased significantly. And, according to 53% of Polish respondents, it has become the most popular tool for maintaining contacts between people and reducing the feeling of isolation. The results of the Women Power study (2021) indicate that during the pandemic, e-competences such as e-learning, e-entertainment, e-health, e-information and e-commerce have also developed. Online shopping in particular turned out to be a skill that was acquired or developed by the majority of respondents (indicated by 43% of women and 42% of men).

Remote work, which had to become the new „normality”, also caused a significant increase in the use of online communication tools (including Zoom, MS Teams, Google Meet, Skype). In Europe, since the restrictions were introduced, the interest in various messengers has increased sevenfold. The results of a YouGov study (Graeme, 2021) show that nearly half (46%) of consumers in 17 markets worldwide use Zoom for regular communication, while around three in ten (29%) use MS Teams and a quarter (25%) uses Skype. Organizations around the world, shocked by the pandemic, tried to quickly equip employees with communication tools that they could use when working remotely. In the early phase of the pandemic, Zoom was the winner and is trying to maintain its position as the most used service.

While it is worth noting, that MS Teams, which is positioning itself as a secure video chat platform, also has a large user base, and research results show that it is widely used in many parts of Europe, beating Zoom in the UK (where 49% of employees regularly uses it), Sweden (44%), Denmark (51%) and Poland (29%). Skype, owned by Microsoft too, also has a large user number and it is the preferred service among the top three services in Poland (39%) and Germany (30%).



**Figure 1.** Tools for video meetings around the world

Source: <https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2021/04/top-video-call-platform-by-market-share.html>

The results of EmailToolTester (2021), conducted in 118 countries around the world, indicate that Zoom is the most frequently used videoconferencing tool in 44 countries (including the United States and the United Kingdom, where the market share is over 55%). MS Teams is the most popular videoconferencing platform in 41 countries, including Poland and the United Arab Emirates, where its market share is 41.91%. Google Meet ranks third, being the most popular tool in 21 countries, such as Denmark and Italy, where the market share is 35.08%. The biggest loss in terms of market share during the pandemic was recorded by Skype, previously one of the most popular tools for communicating with people around the world (see Figure 1).

The digital development of the world, as well as the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic, have changed the communication tools, but the main issue has not changed - communication is to be effective.

## **2. DIFFERENCES IN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN – THEORETICAL APPROACH**

When taking into consideration the differences between women and men in the context of effective communication, it is needed to pay attention to several problematic issues. Handke (2008) raises doubts about the terminology itself and states that it is difficult to unequivocally determine whether we are dealing with a gender language, a bio-language or a metalanguage, or perhaps a communicative style. For the purposes of this article, the terms “*the communication method*”, “*the communication way*”, and “*the communication style*” have been adopted. They are used interchangeably and are understood as communication strategies, that means linguistic and extra-linguistic behaviours characteristic for a given individual (Nęcki, 2000; Kloch, 2000). Taking into consideration the dynamically occurring social changes, which are related to the increased professional activity of women, their greater participation in the public life and changes in the family model, one should be aware that those issues have an impact on the ways of communication between women and men. It is worth emphasizing that the analysis of linguistic differences between women and men may have an impact on the more effective functioning of the organization. It can strengthen and facilitate collaboration in teams, build relationships between members of the organization, and improve communication with external stakeholders.

Previous studies on the differences in communication between men and women highlighted greater expressiveness in the language of women, which manifests itself in the excessive use of exclamation marks, a greater tendency to pampering and diminutive than in men, and revealing emotions, which is often combined with judgement and evaluation (Handke, 1994). Tannen (1999) points out that when communicating, women are focused on creating horizontal social relationships and bonds, which causes them to use words, expressions, and an emotional way of speaking that builds warmth. On the other hand, the relationships created by men are vertical, which means that when communicating, a man defines his place in the social hierarchy and builds his image (boss, leader, expert), and therefore he avoids emotional terms and focuses on a rational assessment of reality. Moreover, Lakoff (1975; 2014) states that women communicate in an uncertain, ambiguous way more often, because it allows them to avoid conflict situations. And on the other hand, it gives them a chance to withdraw their opinion. In the statements of women more often than in the statements of men, indicators of uncertainty appear qualifying statements, protective expressions, negative expressions, and complex requests (Lakoff, 2014). In the literature on the subject (Adler et al., 2006) one can also find statements that

men's style is directive, concise, personal and goal-oriented. On the other hand - as has already been mentioned - since the style of women is focused on building relationships, it turns out to be less directive, more convoluted and ambiguous.

Research results (Adler et al., 2006; Boguta, 2020) partially confirm the common opinion that messages formulated by women are longer and more elaborate, although *“in a conversation with a woman, a man speaks longer than a woman; but the conversations between two women take longer. When talking to men, women are more insecure than men, and among other women they feel as sure as men”* (Adler et al., 2006, p. 132). An important factor differentiating the communicative style of men and women is the size of the group with which they communicate. In larger groups, men speak longer than women, while the smaller the group, the longer the woman's speech (ibid.). Communication is also a source of satisfaction for people - it is fun, and it also serves to express one's views. If interlocutors listen to each other with interest and respect, the needs of respect, recognition, and self-realization are met. *“Although most interviewees make the interaction pleasant, men more often than women put emphasis on humour in the conversation. There are more jokes and mockery in their contacts”* (Adler et al., 2006, p. 131). Women pay more attention to care for the relationship, support, empathy and understanding expressed in the message, as it is the basis for further interactions for them. They are also more emotional (Kornaszewska-Polak, 2013). On the other hand, in male conversations, current tasks, duties, goals dominate, and building relationships is relegated to the background (ibid.).

An important issue from the point of view of the effectiveness of communication is to find an answer to the question whether the communication methods of women and men have changed because of the SARS-Cov-2 pandemic and the spread of online communication on an unprecedented scale. As for the preferences regarding the use of specific online communication tools (applications) during a pandemic, no significant differences between women and men were noticed. The main reason for this is probably the fact that most often the decision about which tools will be used in a given organization is made at the highest management levels. However, it is worth noting that - as shown by the results of a study conducted in the United States (Meyer, 2020) - there are differences in the behaviour of men and women during videoconferencing and online meetings. 55% of women working remotely said that "always" or "sometimes" turned on video (picture) during videoconference meetings, compared with 65% of men. At the same time, it turned out that 35% of women (compared to 25% of men) turn off the video (picture) function during virtual meetings because they do not like their current appearance. Moreover, when preparing for an online meeting, 85% of women style their hair, compared to 74% of men. 80% of the surveyed women change their clothes (compared to 71% of men). More women (83%) than men (77%) care about order in the space that will appear in the camera objectively during the video meeting (ibid.). This is probably due to the lower self-confidence that is characteristic of women communicating in professional situ-

ations, and the fear of being evaluated. Women also have a greater tendency to apologize for their appearance and downplay their roles and statements during online meetings (Goldman, 2020). This is consistent with what was written earlier about the generally higher level of uncertainty of women and their use of uncertainty indicators in verbal communication. From the early ages, women are more likely to use the language of relations, which brings people closer and underestimates their own status in the group. In contrast, boys are expected to use language to demonstrate and strengthen their peers' superiority and to emphasize their strengths and achievements (Tannen, 1995).

These communication differences also occur in working life. Often, men feel more comfortable at work. Moreover, because they are the centre of attention more often, they are credited with equally qualified and competent female colleagues. This situation changed a little during the pandemic as Zoom or MS Teams became the new work environment. Moreover, researchers argue that gender differences in the communication styles are widening on the Internet (Tannen, 2013). It is clear that men and women tend to use online communication tools in different ways (Kimbrough, Guadagno, Muscanell and Dill, 2013). Recognizing those differences may prove beneficial for post-pandemic communication efficiency in the workplace.

### **3. DIFFERENCES IN COMMUNICATION STYLES OF MEN AND WOMEN – EMPIRICAL APPROACH**

Observations and experiences of everyday life, but most of all research results (Nęcki, 2000; Lakoff, 2014; Oppermann and Weber, 2000) indicate that there are differences in the communication styles of women and men. They are caused by biological (e.g. brain lateralization), social (cultural patterns, stereotypes, socialization) and psychological factors. As it has already been mentioned, the most frequently mentioned in the literature of the subject (Lakoff, 2014; Adler et al., 2006; Artymiak, 2010) include:

- length of speech,
- emotionality of statements, manifested at the linguistic level in the use of exclamation marks, diminutives, pampers and vocabulary that expresses emotions,
- using linguistic indicators of uncertainty,
- purpose of speech.

The above differences in communication styles relate to the verbal aspect of the constructed messages. Another issue (equally important and fascinating) are the differences in non-verbal communication between men and women. Non-verbal communication consists of a number of elements, such as: body movements, gestures, touch (haptics), facial movements (micro-expression), time (chronemics), space

(proxemics), speech volume, pace, tone of voice (paralanguage), appearance external. Due to the complexity of issues related to non-verbal communication in the context of differences between women and men, they were not included in the following analysis.

In order to identify differences in the communication styles of women and men, the author analysed transcriptions of recordings with speeches prepared by participants of the Pedagogical Course for the Young PUEB Staff within one of the subjects. The transcriptions were made by the author and were used to consciously eliminate the influence of non-verbal factors in the entire message and to focus on the analysis only on the linguistic aspects of the speeches. What is more, when discussing the results of the analysis of the speeches of women and men, the linguistic aspects that differentiate the communicative style of women and men were taken into consideration.

The speakers were a homogeneous group in terms of the level of education, place of employment and slightly differentiated in terms of age and position (doctoral students, assistants, and assistant professors). Among the speakers there were 9 masters and 13 doctors. 22 presentations were analysed: 9 by women and 13 by men. Moreover, all people conducted online classes, participated in various meetings at PUEB, which were also held remotely, and participated in conferences and other online events. Thus, they experienced similar professional virtual communication situations and used similar online communication tools (applications). All people participated in the Pedagogical Course for the Young PUEB Staff in the academic year 2020/2021, and the analysed speeches were recorded in June 2021.

*The topic* of the speech was given. It was supposed to concern the scientific and/or non-scientific interests of the speaker. Even at this stage of the analysis of the speeches, one can notice the differences between men and women. In most of the speeches made by women, scientific and non-scientific interests were combined. Only one concerned entirely scientific matters, and one - non-scientific interests. As far as the presentations of men are considered - the vast majority concerned scientific issues (only in 2 out of 13 presentations both topics were combined). This fact can be considered as a confirmation of the previously discussed opinion that men focus on facts, reality and specificities when communicating, and women - on building relationships.

*The duration of the speech* was also given and was to be 3 to 5 minutes. Not all of the analysed speeches adjusted to the indicated time limit. It is worth noting, that women's speeches were longer (the shortest lasted 3.0 minutes, and the longest 6.12 minutes) than men's speeches (among them, the shortest lasted 2.48 minutes, and the longest 5.34 minutes). Such results confirm the earlier discussed statement that linguistic messages formulated by women are longer. Moreover, the analysis of the transcripts of the speeches also allowed to establish that in the statements of women there were also more words (729 words) on average than in the statements of men

(619 words).

Another analysed aspect in the speeches was *emotionality*, which was diagnosed taking into consideration the use of exclamation marks, diminutives, pampers and vocabulary expressing emotions by the speakers. In this case, the difference in communication styles between women and men, postulated by researchers (Lakoff 2014), was confirmed. In all the speeches carried out by women, there were terms related to their own emotions, moods and feelings: *"I am very pleased ..."*, *"I have pleasure ..."*, *"I'm happy ..."*, *"this is what I love in what I do"*, *"I love ..."*, *"I like very, very much ..."*, *"I'm stressed ..."*, *"I was afraid..."*

To compare, such terms appeared in 3 out of 13 speeches by men. One of the reasons for this may be the choice of the topic of the speech - most of them were scientific interests, and the professional (scientific) language lacks emotional character. Although it is worth emphasizing that when speaking about scientific interests, women also used expressions reflecting their emotional attitude. It can also be said that men are more specific and focus on the facts, the topic, and not their emotions when speaking.

Positive, affirming adjectives and adverbs also appeared in women's speeches more often than in men's speeches. In the 7 speeches of women, the following phrases could be found many times: *"It's really fascinating"*, *"...extremely interesting and engaging"*, *"I'm interested in...ohohohoh...how long "*, *"it's so beautiful and wonderful "*, *"the great thing is that... "*.

In men's speeches, adjectives and adverbs appeared relatively rarely and most often had a neutral tone: *"Often"*, *"rarely"*, *"the fact is interesting..."*.

When it comes to the use of diminutives and abbreviations, they appeared in 5 (out of 9) speeches carried out by women. They were most often used in those parts of the speeches that concerned non-scientific interests and the family.

*"Little fish"*, *"my sweet little sons"*, *"little daughter"*, *"little bit"*, *"little girl"*.

Such phrases did not appear in any of the speeches made by men.

The presence of uncertainty indicators in linguistic statements, which - as previously mentioned - is a feature of the female style of communication, appeared in 8 out of 9 speeches in which women spoke: *"I don't know if I'm doing it right"*, *"I wasn't sure..."*, *"I was hoping that..."*, *"that's why I think I liked it..."*, *"I thought for a long time..."*, *"I had doubts if that was it?... "*, *"it probably wasn't that, but I had no other idea"*, *"I'm definitely doing it wrong, but what should I do?! "*

In the speeches made by men only in 3 cases (out of 13) there were linguistic indicators of uncertainty, and they took the form of the subjunctive mood of the verbs used: *"I would try, but somehow there was no opportunity"*, *"if I were sure, it would definitely work"*, *"I would have to quit, and I did not want to."*

Caring for relationships and a cordial atmosphere - even in online communication - was manifested in the use of polite phrases at the beginning of the speech ("*hello*", "*good morning*", "*nice to see you*") and at the end ("*thank you*", "*goodbye*", "*see you*", "*bye*"). They appeared in all 9 speeches carried out by women and also in 10 (out of 13) carried out by men. Moreover, women when started their speeches rarely (2 out of 9) introduced themselves with their first names, surnames, probably assuming that there was already a relationship between them, and the recipient of the speeches and it was not necessary. However, often at the beginning of the speech, there was information about the emotional state that was experienced by the speaker during the speech. Most of the men (8 out of 13) identified themselves with their first and last names and added information about the department they work in. Only in two cases was there information about the emotions accompanying the speech. Thus, it can be concluded that men communicated the facts, while women related to the emotions and atmosphere of the speech.

An interesting, non-linguistic, but related to online communication, matter which occurred while analysing the speeches is the diagnosis of a greater tendency of men (5 out of 13) to use additional digital tools in their speeches (e.g. presentations, recordings). Such a situation has not been diagnosed in any of the speeches made by women. On this basis, it is not possible to formulate general conclusions about the higher level of digital competences of men, but this fact was noticeable. One of the reasons for this may be that men talked more about their scientific interests and - probably - tried to build an image of a professional.

The analysis of the language aspects of the speeches of the participants of the Pedagogical Course for the Young PUEB Staff showed that there are differences in the communication styles of women and men. The results of the analysis confirmed the occurrence of the types of differences in communication behaviour between men and women, previously postulated in the literature of the subject.

## CONCLUSIONS

A detailed analysis and identification of differences in the communication ways between men and women can undoubtedly contribute to the improvement of communication efficiency. It is therefore a way to develop communication competences which - as has been mentioned many times - is considered one of the competences of the future. This, in turn, can undoubtedly turn into more effective communication in the workplace. It can also lead to better cooperation in teams, more effective human resources management, or better matching of the organization's messages to the target audience (e.g. customers). Especially in the context of the rapid progress of digitization, as well as in the conditions of the increased use of online communication, which is one of the consequences of the pandemic, the differences in people's communication styles are of particular importance. Because we live in an increasingly diverse society, in which dynamic changes take place,

relationships based on cognition, respect and the use of differences play an increasingly important role.

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